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§1. Introduction 
 
Along with almost all the more important Polish philosophers of the 
twentieth century, Kotarbiński, too, was a student of Kasimir Twardowski, 
and it is Twardowski who is more than anyone else responsible for the 
rigorous thinking and simplicity of expression that is so characteristic of 
Kotarbiński’s work. Twardowski was of course himself a member of the 
Brentanist movement, and the influence of Brentanism on Kotarbiński’s 
writings reveals itself clearly in the fact that the ontological theories which 
Kotarbiński felt called upon to attack in his writings were in many cases just 
those theories defended either by Twardowski or by other thinkers within 
the Brentano tradition. Leśniewski, too, inherited through Twardowski an 
interest in Brentano and his school, and as a young man he had conceived 
the project of translating into Polish the Investigations on General Grammar 
and Philosophy of Language of Anton Marty, one of Brentano’s most 
intimate disciples. Leśniewski, as he himself expressed it, grew up “tuned to 
general grammar and logico-semantic problems à la Edmund Husserl and 
the representatives of the so-called Austrian School”. (1927/31, p. 9)  
 The influence of Brentanism on Polish analytic philosophers such as 
Kotarbiński and Leśniewski has, however, been largely overlooked–     
principally as a result of the fact that the writings of the Polish analytic 
school have been perceived almost exclusively against the background of 
Viennese positivism or of Anglo-Saxon analytic philosophy. It is hoped that 
the present paper, following in the footsteps of Jan Woleński’s recent work,2  
might do something to help rectify this imbalance. The paper will consist of 
a critical survey of Kotarbiński’s development, from his early nominalism 
and ‘pansomatistic reism’ to the later doctrine of ‘temporal phases’. It will 
be shown that the surface clarity and simplicity of Kotarbiński’s writings 
mask a number of profound philosophical difficulties, connected above all 
with the problem of giving an adequate account of the truth of contingent 
(tensed) predications. The paper will examine in particular the attempts to 
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resolve these difficulties on the part of Leśniewski. It will continue with an 
account of the relations of Kotarbińskian reism to the ontology of things or 
entia realia defended by the later Brentano. Kotarbiński’s identification of 
Brentano as a precursor of reism is, it will be suggested, at least 
questionable, and the paper will conclude with a more careful attempt to 
situate the Brentanian and Kotarbińskian ontologies within the spectrum of 
competing ontological views. 
 
 
§2. Stages in the Development of Reism 
 
We shall be concerned, in the first place, with Kotarbiński’s magnum opus, 
the Elements of the Theory of Knowledge, Formal Logic and Methodology 
of the Sciences, first published in 1929 and hereafter referred to as Elementy. 
The principal doctrine expounded and defended by Kotarbiński in this work 
is that of ‘reism’, a doctrine according to which all existence is made up 
entirely of individual things, realia or concreta. A more specialised version 
of the doctrine is referred to by Kotarbiński as the doctrine of ‘somatism’ (or 
sometimes also ‘pansomatism’), which results when one adds the thesis that 
individual things are to be identified in every case as physical bodies – a 
thesis which Kotarbiński also accepts. In an essay of 1958 appended to the 
second edition of his Elementy, Kotarbiński speaks retrospectively of seven 
‘stages’ in the development of the reistic theory, from his own early 
acceptance of nominalism – which he himself preferred to call ‘concretism’ 
– to the working out of a full-blown pansomatist ontology in the 1930s.3  
 It is especially in relation to the early stages that Twardowski’s influence 
is most strongly felt. Stage 1 consists in the rejection of universals, 
properties, or general objects. All entities are individuals, on this 
(‘concretist’) view, though it does not thereby follow that they must all be 
things. Kotarbiński’s adoption of nominalism in this sense may be attributed 
on the one hand to the effects of his early exposure to the thinking of the 
British empiricists at the hands of Twardowski. On the other hand however 
it can be seen as a reaction against Twardowski’s own thesis that there are 
general objects, objects which result when the features common to the 
particular objects falling under a given concept are ‘unified into a whole’.4 
A discipline like geometry, in Twardowski’s view, is concerned precisely 
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with general objects in this sense (Triangle, Circle, Square, and so forth), 
and a similar thesis may be extended to the other sciences. As Husserl points 
out in his Logical Investigations, general objects as conceived by 
Twardowski are subject to all the disadvantages of the Lockean general 
triangle.5 This suggestion is taken still further by Leśniewski, Kotarbiński’s 
colleague in Warsaw, who offers a proof that Twardowski’s theory (together 
with a range of similar theories, including Husserl’s own) is contradictory,6 
and Kotarbiński would later claim that it was only concerning universals or 
general objects that nominalism “succeeded in convincingly proving their 
non-existence by a reductio ad absurdum.” (1966, p. 55)  
 Stage 2 consists in the rejection of events, processes, states of affairs, 
and other putative individuals falling outside the category thing. This, too, 
may be interpreted as a reaction on Kotarbiński’s part to the Brentanist 
views of his teacher Twardowski, given that the ontology of states of affairs 
or Sachverhalte was, in the first decades of this century, a quite peculiar 
preserve of the Brentanist movement.7  
 Stage 3, the rejection of sets or classes, reflects the influence of 
Leśniewski, and above all of Leśniewski’s criticisms of the theory of sets.8 
The set-theoretical antinomies had resulted, in Leśniewski’s view, not from 
any inherent contradiction in the notion of set as originally conceived by 
Cantor, but from a departure from this notion in the direction of a 
conception of sets as abstract entities. As Cantor puts it: “Every set of 
well-differentiated things can be conceived as a unitary thing in which these 
things are constituent parts or constitutive elements.” (Cantor 1887/88, p. 
379) Thus for example a musical composition is a set consisting of the 
sounds which are its constituents, a painting is a set consisting of various 
patches of colour. A set, therefore, on Leśniewski’s interpretation of 
Cantor’s views, is a concrete whole made up of concrete parts, not an 
abstract entity sealed off from changes in the real world of material things.9 
According to Leśniewski, it would be correct to say, for example, that the 
Black Forest is just the set of trees now growing in a certain area, and that 
this set becomes smaller as trees within it die. Clearly, on this view, there 
can be no empty set, and a set consisting of just one object as member will 
be identical with that object. Further, there can be no sets of higher type, 
which means also that there is no way in which the more usual antinomies 
may be generated. 
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 Frege, too, as Leśniewski points out, attacks those mathematicians who 
introduce into their theories such arbitrary ‘inventions’ as the empty set, 
merely because they prove expedient for certain purposes.10 Leśniewski’s 
own strictures in this respect are directed in particular against axiomatic 
theories of sets such as were developed by Zermelo. These do not merely 
lack the sort of naturalness that would dispose one to accept them; they lack 
also that intrinsic intelligibility which would make their meaning clear, so 
that Leśniewski can in all honesty assert that he does not understand what is 
meant by ‘set’ as this term is supposed to be ‘implicitly defined’ by theories 
like Zermelo’s.11  
 Leśniewski, himself, in contrast, starts not from ‘inventions’ or from 
axioms or hypotheses selected for pragmatic reasons, but from what he calls 
intuitions, commonly accepted and meaningful to all, relating to such 
concepts as whole, part, totality, object, identity, and so on.12 The language 
of Leśniewski’s theories is therefore an extrapolation of natural language, a 
making precise of what, in natural language, is left inarticulate or indistinct. 
His work forms part of that strand in the development of logic, represented 
also by Frege and by the early Russell, which sees logic as a descriptive 
enterprise, part and parcel of the attempt to produce formal theories 
adequate to and true of the actual world.13 Hence he is mistrustful, too, of 
the model-theoretic semantics that has been built up on an abstract 
set-theoretical basis, and he is opposed also to the work of those formalist 
logicians who embrace an essentially abstract-algebraic approach to logic, 
or see logic as having to deal essentially with uninterpreted formal 
systems.14   
 Stage 4 in the development of reism, which consists in the rejection by 
Kotarbiński of mental images and other ‘immanent contents’, again reflects 
the influence of Twardowski. The status of mental entities was an issue of 
particular importance to Kotarbiński, since it marked one of the very few 
areas of disagreement between himself and Leśniewski. For Leśniewski 
admitted contents and images into his ontology, remaining in this respect 
faithful to the heritage of Brentano and Twardowski,15  Thus Leśniewski, in 
this sense and perhaps also in others, is not a reist. Since, however, like 
Brentano, Marty and Twardowski, he held that contents are concrete items, 
tied, in effect, to specific mental episodes, his acceptance of contents does 
not imply a departure from nominalism or ‘concretism’.  
ON THE PHASES OF REISM 119
 Stage 5, which consists in the awakening of Kotarbiński’s interest in 
certain precursors of his own way of thinking, was provoked by the 
discovery of what he took to be reist tendencies in Brentano’s later work – a 
matter which will be dealt with in more detail below. 
 Stage 6 consists in an amendment to the reist doctrine, provoked by 
criticisms put forward by Ajdukiewicz in his 1930 review of the Elementy.16 
These criticisms concern in particular the question as to how the negative 
theses of reism (‘properties do not exist’, ‘events do not exist’, and so on) 
are properly to be treated. Are such formulations to be accepted as they 
stand as literal renderings? Certainly not, Ajdukiewicz claims, if ‘exists’ is 
taken in the literal sense – the sense it has in sentences like ‘rabbits exist’, 
‘dinosaurs no longer exist’ and so on. For the subjects of such sentences are 
in every case the names of things, which is ex hypothesi not the case where 
we have to deal with expressions like ‘property’, ‘event’, and so on.  Yet the 
reist allows no other sense of ‘exists’. 
 Kotarbiński himself initially responded to this criticism by taking up 
Ajdukiewicz’s suggestion that the negative theses of ontology be 
reformulated on the level of semantics, as theses to the effect that certain 
kinds of apparent statement are nonsensical.17 This solution is unsatisfactory 
for a number of reasons. It implies, first of all, a view of ‘words with 
negative meanings’ which would seemingly allow them to be employed as a 
means of constructing well-formed sentences more or less at random from 
nonsensical strings of words. Further, as Lejewski points out in his paper On 
the Dramatic Stage in the Development of Kotarbiński’s Pansomatism, it 
implies that ‘the negative theses of ontological reism fail to say anything 
about reality’ because they are merely ‘statements about the language of the 
reist.’ (1979, p. 200) A semantical doctrine in this sense must however, as 
Lejewski argues, presuppose a prior ontological doctrine: ‘Semantics 
without ontology is like a house without foundations. It collapses into a set 
of arbitrary injunctions and prohibitions justified by ad hoc considerations.’ 
(1979, pp. 205f.) Moreover, how, in the absence of some more deep-seated 
ontological theory, could the reist be assured of the truth of his semantic 
claim that all onomatoids will vanish in ultimate formulations? And how 
could he account for the fact that, as he will want to insist, translation into 
the language of things is both natural and clarificatory?  
BARRY SMITH 120 
 There is, however, an alternative response to Ajdukiewicz’s criticism. 
This is to accept that the reist’s negative theses make good sense (are in 
good grammatical order) as they stand, not, however, in the language of the 
reist but in the language of his opponent, i.e. of someone who accepts both a 
multicategorial ontology (accepts categories other than that of thing) and the 
concomitant multicategorial language. For if, as Lejewski puts it, the 
multicategorial ontologist’s assertions ‘are made in terms of a 
multicategorial language, the same language must be used to negate those 
assertions’. Propositions such as ‘there are no properties’, ‘there are no 
relations’, ‘there are no events’, etc., are properly  
  
 to be understood in the light of the multicategorial idealization of natural language. 
And on this assumption the nouns ‘property’, ‘relation’, ‘event’, etc. belong to 
different fundamental semantical categories, which in turn determine the semantical 
category of the expression ‘there are no’ in each of the conjuncts. (Lejewski 1979, 
pp. 211f.)  
 
The reist, we might say, can accept his opponent’s multicategorial language 
as a ladder, to be thrown away when once it has served its polemical 
purpose. 
 Stage 7 sees the re-institution of reism as an ontological doctrine, 
founded on a recognition of the need to supply non-tautological definitions 
of notions such as ‘thing’, ‘object’, ‘body’, etc. This development, too, was 
provoked by a criticism of Ajdukiewicz, a criticism to the effect that, if 
‘exists’ has a literal sense only when used in conjunction with names for 
things, then the positive statement of reism, to the effect that only things 
exist, is tautological. It is equivalent to the truism: ‘only things are things’.  
 Here, also, Kotarbiński’s initial reaction was one of retreat to semantics. 
Later, however, he responded to Ajdukiewicz’s objection in a more 
ontologically-minded fashion, by seeking definitions of concepts such as 
‘thing’, ‘object’, ‘body’, etc., in a way which he hoped would render non- 
tautological the fundamental theses of reism and somatism. Since a formal 
statement of such definitions has been provided by Lejewski in his 
just-mentioned paper, it will be sufficient here if we examine briefly (and 
critically) the concepts Kotarbiński here employs. 
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 All reality, according to Kotarbiński, is composed exclusively of things, 
and things are in every case bodies. Kotarbiński initially sought to define 
body as that which is extended in space and time, as that which is ‘bulky 
and lasting’. Then, however, he saw reason to add the further condition that 
bodies are ‘inert’. Certainly it would be sufficient, Kotarbiński holds, to 
define ‘body’ as ‘that which is extensive’: 
 
 But in order to avoid misunderstandings which might lead someone to suppose, on 
the strength of that definition, that physics is also concerned with ‘fragments of 
empty space’ (which in our opinion, do not exist) or ‘immanent coloured patches’ 
(which also seems to be a hypostasis), we prefer to narrow the definition as to 
intension – without thereby, as we think, narrowing its extension – by adopting the 
formula stating that ‘a body is what is extensive and inert’. (1966, p. 330)  
  
In other contexts Kotarbiński preferred to define body as: that which is 
extensive and such as to offer resistance. All is not quite clear, however, 
about the application of either formula. Thus Kotarbiński is on the one hand 
keen to insist that the term ‘body’, as he understands it, embraces not only 
planets, rocks, etc., but also objects investigated by physics ‘such as 
electrons, protons, magnetic fields’. (1966, p. 331) On the other hand, 
however, he stresses that it excludes for example ‘immanent coloured 
patches’. Consider, however, the example of a glass cube that is uniformly 
red in colour. Is the transcendent redness of this cube (an individual 
three-dimensionally extended moment of colour), a body, on Kotarbiński’s 
view? Certainly it is bulky and lasting and, perforce, such as to offer 
resistance. Kotarbiński, it would seem, was able to ignore such cases in 
framing his account of ‘body’ only because his attentions were concentrated 
on instances of surface colour, entities which fall short of 
three-dimensionality and can be excluded on this count. In order to rule out 
examples like the cube of colour, Kotarbiński would have to add the 
condition that a body is that which exists (is extended and inert) in its own 
right (has need of no other thing in order to exist).18 As we shall see, a 
condition of this sort is very much in the spirit of Aristotle. Certainly such a 
condition would capture the sense in which the given example gives 
grounds for suspicion – that the cube of colour exists merely as a dependent 
moment of the cube of glass, and enjoys no separate existence. Yet how are 
we to formulate the condition in question in such a way that it would not 
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rule out other examples which we would wish to count as bona fida bodies? 
Does a human being, for example, exist ‘in his own right’, given that he has 
need, for example, of nourishment, and processes of breathing and 
metabolising (to say nothing of parents), in order to exist? How, moreover, 
are we to make precise the sense of ‘other’ in ‘has need of no other thing’? 
Simple non-identity will not do, since everything may in this sense stand in 
need of its own proper parts in order to exist. On the other hand 
spatiotemporal discreteness or disjointness will not serve, either, since the 
cube and its colour would seem to coincide in space and time. All that can 
be said here is that considerations such as this have exercised Kotarbiński 
(and Leśniewski, et. al.) too little, so that the project of a somatist ontology 
still leaves much to be desired in terms of a clear statement of what is meant 
by ‘body’. 
  
 
§3. Reism and Truth 
 
Kotarbiński’s reism is, as we have seen, a doctrine according to which all 
existence is made up entirely of individual things. At the same time he 
defended in the Elementy a form of the correspondence theory of truth 
derived from his teacher Twardowski. Twardowski himself had at least at 
one stage in his career come to the conclusion that a conception of truth as 
correspondence requires special ‘states of affairs’, unitary entities which 
would stand to sentences or acts of judgment in something like the way in 
which things or objects in the narrow sense would stand to names or acts of 
presentation.19 Not only Twardowski, but also Husserl, Meinong and Marty, 
as well as the early Moore, Russell and Wittgenstein were drawn to similar 
views. How, then, was it possible for Kotarbiński to maintain a 
correspondence theory of truth and at the same time embrace the view that 
there are no entities other than things?  
 Kotarbiński himself holds that this dilemma may be resolved by 
rejecting that ontological interpretation of correspondence (derived from the 
scholastics) which would interpret truth in terms of ‘copies’ of reality 
existing somehow in the mind of the judging subject. He advances, rather, 
what might nowadays be called an adverbial theory of truth: 
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 The point is not that a true thought should be a good copy or simile of the thing of 
which we are thinking, as a painted copy or a photograph is. A brief reflection 
suffices to recognize the metaphorical nature of such a comparison. A different 
interpretation of ‘accordance with reality’ is required. We shall confine ourselves to 
the following: ‘John thinks truly if and only if John thinks that things are so and so, 
and things in fact are so and so’. (1966, pp. 106f.)  
 
He came, in other words, to interpret the correspondence theory in the 
superficially neutral terms of the Aristotelian ‘to say of what is that it is not, 
or of what is not that it is, is false, while to say of what is that it is, or of 
what is not that it is not, is true.’20 Conceptions of truth in terms of the copy 
theory are to be avoided, from Kotarbiński’s point of view, not merely 
because they involve a hypostatisation of states of affairs or other special 
entities on the side of the object; they commit us also, on the side of the 
subject, to ‘immanent contents’, ‘thoughts’, ‘judgments’, ‘propositions’ or 
‘meanings’ – and all of these terms are mere façons de parler, to be 
eliminated from any language adequate to the purposes of philosophy. 
When I judge truly, then I judge in accordance with the things, and that is all 
that need be said. 
 Can matters really be so simple, however? Certainly in the case of 
judgments expressed by positive existential sentences such as ‘John exists’ 
or ‘cheetahs exist’, it is plausible to account for their truth or falsehood 
exclusively on the basis of an appeal to things or bodies as commonly 
understood. ‘John exists’, on a view of this sort, is made true by John 
himself; ‘cheetahs exist’ by some one or more cheetahs.21 But how, on this 
basis, are we to deal with negative existential judgments like ‘Baal does not 
exist’ or ‘there are no unicorns’. It was precisely difficulties in the treatment 
of judgments such as this which led some Brentanists to the view that what 
makes a judgment true are special sui generis entities designated by 
expressions of the form: the existence of A, the non-existence of B, the 
existence of an A which is B, and so on, where ‘A’ and ‘B’ stand in for 
expressions like a horse, the redness over there, unicorns, God, Ba’al, and 
so on. The consideration of sentences like ‘John is suntanned’, ‘John is 
eating’, ‘John is a heavy eater’, ‘John’s eating is on the increase’, ‘John has 
a bad case of dispepsia’, ‘there is a ridge of high pressure over the Atlantic’, 
suggests moreover that the domain of such special, non-thingly truth- 
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makers must be extended even more widely, to embrace events, processes 
and conditions, as well as complex states of affairs involving these as parts.  
 How, then, can Kotarbiński cope with cases such as this in a way that 
will not stretch ontologically beyond the realm of things? Two answers to 
this question may suggest themselves: 
 (1) that it would be possible to effect a logical or linguistic analysis of 
the sentences in question, of a sort that would reveal their underlying form 
as involving a relation only to things; 
 (2) that it would be possible to embrace special sorts of things as 
truth-makers for the given sentences, so that reism would be saved, though 
only at the expense of our embracing a notion of ‘thing’ which would depart 
in some degree from common sense. 
 As we shall see, elements of both solutions are present in Kotarbiński’s 
work.  
 
 
§4. Problems of Semantics 
 
Let us look, first, at the semantic side of Kotarbiński’s doctrine. Consider 
the sentence ‘John’s jump cleared the hurdle’. This seems to refer to a 
certain concrete individual event or process – John’s jump – which occurred 
at a certain time. And it must therefore surely correspond, if true, to a 
segment of reality containing this jump as part. We have a strong intuitive 
disposition to suppose that any account of what makes the given sentence 
true will be inadequate if it takes no account of this specific jump. 
According to Kotarbiński, however, this intuition cannot even be properly 
expressed. For all apparent references to jumps and other events or 
processes are ‘merely substitutive’. A literal rendering of the intentions of 
one who utters the sentence in question would be: ‘John jumped clear of the 
hurdle’, a sentence in which the only names that occur are names for 
things.22 It is renderings of this sort, Kotarbiński insists,  that reproduce ‘the 
intention of any statement that says something about an event or events.’ 
For, ‘it is only seemingly (and never in fact) that we can make a true 
statement about an event, namely if we take that statement in its substitutive, 
and not literal and fundamental role.’ References to events are mere 
‘onomatoids’ or ‘apparent names’. They are terms which merely sound like 
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names. When the attempt is made to establish a literal interpretation, then it 
becomes clear that the expressions in question belong to a category quite 
different from that of names in the strict and proper sense.23  
 Physics too, of course, along with many other sciences such as 
phonology, military history and meteorology, seems to trade largely in 
sentences of greater or lesser generality about events. Such disciplines are, 
accordingly, in need of radical linguistic reform, so that, as Kotarbiński 
points out, ‘one of the most topical but unperformed tasks of concretism is 
to work out a dictionary of mathematics and physics [and of other sciences] 
in the reistic interpretation.’24 It is not difficult to appreciate the obstacles 
confronting such a project in relation, say, to the physicist’s talk of 
energy-fields characterising points or regions of spacetime. Kotarbiński in 
fact copes with the latter not by semantic means, but ontologically. As we 
have seen, he accepts into his ontology fields and other creatures of physics. 
These, too, are extended in space and time and are ‘such as to offer 
resistance’ (or, at least, they are presumably such as to be involved in causal 
relations of certain sorts). Reality, as the reist conceives it, is not therefore ‘a 
static conglomerate’ (‘a mere sum’) of ‘rigid and changeless solids’; it is a 
‘fabric composed of changing things’, in a new and extended sense of 
‘thing’.25 No explicit criterion is provided, however, as to what is ‘thing’ 
and what ‘event’ on this more liberal dispensation, so that one does not 
know, for example, whether quarks, neutrinos, or flashes of lightning are to 
be admitted as (short-lived) things or rejected as events. 
 Moreover, even where we are dealing with non-scientific sentences of 
the everyday world, the reist’s literal renderings are not in every case so 
easy to come by. What, for example, is to count as a ‘literal’ rendering of a 
judgment like: ‘John’s jump impressed the spectators’? Perhaps: ‘John 
jumped and impressed the spectators’. Yet it is far from clear that this 
rendering is even roughly adequate. John’s jump, after all, may have 
impressed the spectators, but not John himself. Or John may have jumped, 
and impressed the spectators, without it being the case that it was his jump 
by which they were impressed.26  
 Kotarbiński’s problem here results from the fact that there is as it were a 
selectivity of intentional verbs like ‘see’ or ‘think about’ or ‘be impressed 
by’. It seems that such verbs may relate their subjects to entities such as 
events, processes, images, contents, meanings, surfaces, boundaries, states 
BARRY SMITH 126 
of affairs, absences, and so on, in ways not accountable for exclusively in 
terms of any mere directedness to things. Such selectivity is characteristic 
especially of memory, which may as it were conceal from our present 
consciousness the things which serve as supports for events or 
circumstances remembered. Thus Harry may remember the intonation of 
Mary’s voice, yet he may have forgotten both Mary herself and the voice 
that had this certain quite specific intonation.27  
 Further problems arise for an approach of the sort sketched by 
Kotarbiński when we consider sentences apparently involving quantification 
over events or types of event (John danced the same jig twice), or when we 
consider relational or comparative sentences like Mary’s blush was redder 
than Susan’s, The beginning of John’s jump was more elegant than the end 
of Jack’s, and so on.28  
 Kotarbiński himself, of course, since he believes that somatistic reism is 
true, can countenance neither a selectivity of mind to non-things, nor the 
possibility of relations involving apparent non-things in ways which could 
not be cashed out satisfactorily in terms of corresponding things. Hence he 
is constrained to hold, for example, that when Harry remembers the 
intonation of Mary’s voice, then there is of necessity a sense in which he 
remembers Mary also, and that the precise content of his memory can be 
accounted for without loss of content in terms of his relation to this and 
other things. 
 Later reists in the Polish tradition take a more relaxed view of such 
translation problems, conceiving reistic semantic analysis as of value only 
when confined to theses purely philosophical in character. Outside ontology, 
as Lejewski puts it, reistic semantics ‘loses its rationale’: 
  
 There is not much point in avoiding abstract noun-expressions in disciplines of 
lesser generality. Elimination of onomatoids from final pronouncements is of 
paramount importance only if these final pronouncements are meant to be used in 
ontological arguments.29  
 
Now there is, certainly, some justice to this, if it means that the reist is 
restrained from embarking on gratuitous attempts to reform the language of 
his fellows, language which must surely be in order as it is. What Lejewski 
has to say should not, however, be interpretated as implying that we may 
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properly ignore those forms of everyday and scientific language which pose 
prima facie problems for the would-be reist translator. 
 
 
§5. Kotarbińskian Psychology 
 
As we have seen, Kotarbiński rejects the doctrine of mental contents 
propounded by his teacher Twardowski. Contents and images are, as 
Kotarbiński points out, commonly held to come into being when someone 
recalls something or dreams of something. The subject who dreams or 
remembers is then ‘ready to formulate various true judgments, allegedly 
pertaining to those images’. (1966, pp. 430f.) Brentanists such as 
Twardowski had defended the thesis that such contents or mental images 
enjoy an immanent existence ‘in the subject’ or ‘in a person’s head’.30  
Kotarbiński, however, could not see how this ‘in’ is properly to be 
interpreted. Surely not spatially, ‘as though it referred to the nervous tissue 
in the brain?’ (And where, for example, would we locate such mental 
phenomena as the pain in a phantom limb?) Yet it seems equally 
inappropriate to regard mental images as located outside the brain, for 
instance where imagined external objects seem to be located. Leśniewski 
had been prepared to conclude from these difficulties that contents and 
images exist ‘nowhere’, a conclusion perhaps in the spirit of Descartes, with 
his view of res cogitans as unextended, and accepted also among the 
Brentanists.31 Kotarbiński, however, could permit himself no such radical 
departure from somatistic realism and concluded that immanent contents 
and images are not to be accepted as bona fide things at all. This conclusion 
he saw as being supported further by the fact that such putative entities are 
not three-dimensional. Thus they cannot count as ‘bodies’ as ordinarily 
understood, and this, for Kotarbiński, rules out their counting as things in 
any sense.32 
 But how, then, are we to cope semantically with our apparent references 
to images and other like phenomena? Here, again, Kotarbiński’s attack is 
two-pronged, both semantic and ontological. On the one hand he hopes, 
with Leśniewski, to ‘de-intensionalise’ psychological statements, to find 
means of converting such statements to extensional forms. On the other 
hand, however, he hopes to develop a reistic conception of the discipline of 
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psychology itself, a conception according to which psychology would deal 
not with mental acts of hearing or thinking or desiring and with the contents 
of such acts, but rather with things of certain sorts – with the sentient person, 
the hearer, thinker, or desirer.  
 That which sees and hears and desires is, Kotarbiński holds, identical 
with a certain organism (or at least with some part of the organism such as 
the brain or the system of nerve receptors).33 To think, then, is to be a 
thinking brain or body, a brain or body which, in non-reistic language, 
enjoys certain special states or processes of thinking. As Kotarbiński is 
himself careful to stress, this is not a materialist or behaviourist doctrine. For 
while he certainly holds that physics investigates all that there is, 
Kotarbiński does not suppose that all scientific statements about what there 
is will turn out to be statements of physics. As for Spinoza, so also for 
Kotarbiński, it is as if, in the case of sentient beings, one single substance is 
able to support two different systems of mutually incommensurable 
modifications. Physics describes how sentient organisms (and other bodies) 
move and how their particles are located. Psychology describes how sentient 
organisms think and feel.34  
 Suppose, however, that during some given period of time one and the 
same sentient organism is both thinking and jumping. The same thing, in 
such circumstances, is both a thinker and a jumper. Is not the reist left in 
such circumstances with no means in his ontology to distinguish between 
what are, surely, activities of different sorts? Clearly, he cannot solve this 
problem by appealing to the fact that different (mental and physical) 
predicates are applied to the thing in question, for the issue here is precisely 
that of establishing in virtue of what such different predications count as 
true, and to this end the reist has only things to which he can appeal. The 
problem cannot be solved, either, by appealing to any special understanding 
of the material ‘thing that thinks’ (which had been left indeterminate by 
Kotarbiński himself). For whichever concrete thing is fixed upon by the reist 
as that which thinks, be it the brain, the central nervous system, or some 
other proper or improper part of the organism as a whole, there will always 
be physical truths about the thing selected in relation to which the given 
problem will recur. Moreover, whatever the nature of the material thing that 
the reist puts forward as his candidate ‘thing that thinks’, it seems not 
logically excluded that two parallel consciousnesses should be realised 
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simultaneously within it, after the manner of Siamese twins. We might then 
have occasion to assert that consciousness1 is thinking this, while 
consciousness2 is thinking that, and then it seems that the reist – short of 
assuming special immaterial things – would have no way of doing justice to 
the presence of parallel thinking processes in the given case, for there are ex 
hypothesi no separate bodies which might here serve as subjects of the 
respective predications. What is not logically excluded seems thereby to be 
ruled out by the fiat of the reist’s linguistic predilections. 
 Reism has consequences not only for the subjects of mental experiences, 
however, but for the objects of such experiences also. As already stated, the 
reist insists that that to which our experiences are related is in every case a 
thing. In everyday perception, as also in hallucinations, dreams and 
memories, we are typically presented with external things which seem to us 
to be coloured and shaped in this or that particular way. And in dreams and 
memories, as Kotarbiński puts it, we as it were ‘observe, though somehow 
in a secondary manner, things from our past environment, which seem to us 
to be such or another’. (1966, p. 431) 
 This account will clearly face problems in connection with iterated 
reference to what is mental – dreams about dreams, for example – as also in 
connection with that peculiar selectivity of memory and other acts discussed 
in §4 above. Kotarbiński’s view, nevertheless, is that our mental experiences 
are in every case a matter of our being related in special ways to things. 
From this it follows that all (third person) psychological statements must 
have literal readings of one or other of the forms: 
 
        A feels this: B  
        A experiences this: B, 
        A thinks this: B,  
 
and so on – where ‘A’ stands in for the name of some sentient body and ‘B’ 
for words or phrases which answer the question ‘what?’: ‘What does John 
imagine?’, ‘What does John think?’, ‘What does John want?’, and so on. ‘B’ 
will stand, typically, for a ‘summary description of [A’s] surroundings made 
in extrospective terms’, and is supposed in every case to involve reference 
exclusively to things.35  
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   A slightly different analysis may be required for statements like ‘my tooth 
aches’ or ‘I feel sick’. These may on the one hand be compared to 
statements like ‘my shoe is pinching’. Taken in this sense, ‘I feel sick’ 
would be formulated as ‘This is sickening’, ‘where the indicative pronoun 
would point to a certain region of the alimentary tract and adjacent parts of 
the body.’ (1966, p. 348) Quite often, however, the sense of ‘I feel sick’ is to 
signify ‘I experience a feeling of sickness’ and this is a statement which 
complies with the original Kotarbińskian scheme. It means ‘I experience 
this: it (my body) is sickening’ – where again, reference is made exclusively 
to things.  
 But in virtue of what are sentences of the form ‘A feels...’, and so on, 
true? Perhaps we can express Kotarbiński’s view as follows. It is as if there 
are certain sui generis determinations of sentient bodies in virtue of which 
such bodies are directed in a quite specific way to things. It is of course not 
the case that the determinations in question could be somehow isolated, 
whether actually or in thought, in such a way that they could be examined in 
their own right. Yet they are not simply unknowable, either; for there exists 
the possibility of imitation, in the sense that one subject can think in a way 
which duplicates the thought-determinations of another. Such imitation is 
possible because our mental determinations characteristically express 
themselves physically in a range of familiar ways. Above all, there is an 
organic relationship between a subject’s feelings or thoughts and the kinds 
of things he says. Hence we can come to know the former indirectly, by 
coming to an understanding of the latter in a way which amounts to a (more 
or less perfect) duplication of those mental determinations which they 
characteristically bring to expression. Here Kotarbiński draws on the work 
on meaning and expression of his teacher Twardowski,36 as also on Gestalt 
psychological ideas concerning our knowledge of other minds.37 Strangely, 
he applies these ideas even to reflexive self-knowledge. We acquire 
knowledge of our own experiences, he holds, only by ‘self-imitation’,38 so 
that there may be a sense in which we do not know what we think until we 
hear what we say. 
 Kotarbiński’s claim, then, is that we may come to know what another 
person experiences by allowing ourselves to be guided by his statements or 
by other overt behaviour in such a way that we come to imitate his 
experiences within ourselves. Reistically expressed, we can make ourselves 
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think or feel (more or less) as the other person thinks or feels, by allowing 
ourselves to be determined psychically by the things he says. (The question- 
begging nature of this idea becomes clear immediately if we ask ourselves 
in what respect we can speak of ‘likeness’ or ‘similarity’ here.) 
  
 We try to interpret the word ‘experiencing’ as follows. It is merely an 
announcement of the imitation of the individual spoken of by the speaker, and it 
informs in a summary way in what respect he will be imitated; thus, that the 
individual spoken of will be imitated as looking, or listening, or exploring tactually, 
and so on (1935, p. 499). 
 
For this to make sense in reist terms, therefore, it must be that our utterances 
themselves are in some extended sense imitations of the very psychic 
determinations they bring to expression.39  Thus in the general formula of 
the psychological statement ‘A experiences this: B’, the ‘B’ may be seen as 
an imitation in this extended sense by the one who makes the given 
statement of the relevant experience on the part of A. When I say, ‘John 
thinks this: 2 + 2 = 4’, ‘John feels this: they are playing badly’, ‘John doubts 
this: do angels exist?’, ‘John desires this: to be happy’, then I become a 
samesayer with the way John thinks or feels. And we can even 
  
 generalize this formula so that not only a sentence, but any phrase referring to how a 
given person experiences, could be substituted for ‘B’. It might even be an 
inarticulate exclamation, so that a given psychological statement would be: ‘John 
experiences so: Oh!’ (1966, p. 428) 
  
Kotarbiński’s remarks here will remind us of Davidson’s analysis of indirect 
discourse in his paper "On Saying That" of 1968. My assertion of ‘Galileo 
said that the earth moves’, on this analysis, is an assertion to the effect that 
Galileo said something, and my immediately succeeding utterance of ‘the 
earth moves’ makes Galileo and me samesayers:  
 
            Galileo said that. 
            The earth moves. 
 
Here it is only the first sentence, consisting of the name of a speaker, a two 
place predicate ‘said’ and a demonstrative pronoun, that is asserted. The 
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second sentence is, as it were,  merely exhibited or named. For Davidson, 
too, therefore, there is a sense in which the best we can do is to imitate 
(make ourself samesayers with) the speaker whose words we are reporting.40 
A similar idea was incidentally advanced already by Leśniewski41  who 
considers an interpretation of expressions of the type ‘|— p’ in the language 
of Principia Mathematica as meaning: 
 
       that which follows is asserted   p. 
 
As Küng points out, it is an important feature of such devices that they allow 
us to talk about a sentence while employing to this end not a name of the 
sentence but (a token of) the sentence itself; that is, they allow us to avoid 
an ascent into the metalanguage ‘while at the same time obtaining benefits 
usually associated with such an ascent.’ (Küng 1974, pp. 243f.) A similar 
device can be used also to avoid an ascent into set-theoretical language: 
instead of ‘The set of men is identical with the set of featherless bipeds’, we 
can say: ‘The following two items are extensionally identical: man, 
featherless biped’. As Küng argues, it is a device of this sort that lies at the 
basis of Leśniewski’s understanding of the quantifiers.42  
 
 
§6. The Aristotelian Concept of Thing 
 
Kotarbiński started out, in the Elementy, from the common-sense idea of 
thing as physical body. He drew, in particular, on the clarification of this 
idea that was set forth by Aristotle in his treatment of ‘first substance’ in the 
Categories and in the Metaphysics. Thus at the beginning of the Elementy 
we read:  
 
 it is in Aristotle that we can trace the distinction, within the category of things, 
namely, of first and second substances. Those second substances, universals, are the 
first to fall victim to eliminating analysis as carried out by nominalism... On the 
other hand, first substances, things in the primary sense of the word, and for us 
simply things, fared in exactly the opposite way, since the entire reduction of 
categories [takes] place precisely to their benefit. (1966, p. 55) 
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What, then, are the marks of things or first substances as Aristotle conceives 
them?43  
 (i) They are, first of all, individual. A substance is a ‘this’, it is ‘one in 
number’. (Cat., 3 b 10) 
 (ii) They are not ‘predicable of a subject’ nor ‘present in a subject’. 
(Cat., 2 a 11–13, Met., 1017 b 10–14, 1028 b 35f., 1029 a 1) 
 (iii) They are that which can exist on their own, where accidents require 
a support from things or substances in order to exist. First substances are 
prior in all senses: in definition, in order of knowledge, and in time. (Met., 
1028 a 30ff.) 
 (iv) They are that which serves to individuate the accident, to make it the 
entity that it is – a feature seen by Brentano as the most crucial element of 
the Aristotelian theory. (Anal. post., 83 a 25, Met., 1030 b 10ff., Cat., 2 b 
1ff.)44  
 (v) They are that which, while remaining numerically one and the same, 
can admit contrary accidents at different times. (Cat., 4 a 10) 
 (vi) They are able to stand in causal relations. (Met., 1041 a 9) 
 (vii) They are ‘one by a process of nature’. A substance has the unity of 
a living thing. Hence it enjoys a certain natural completeness or 
rounded-offness, both in contrast to parts of things and in contrast to heaps 
or masses of things. (Met., 1040 b 5–16, 1041 b 12, 1041 b 28–31, 1052 a 
22ff., 1070 b 36–1071 a 4, Cat., 1 b 5)45 Hence also, for Aristotle, a thing is 
that which has no actual but only possible parts. (Met., 1054 a 20ff.)  A part 
of a thing, for as long as it remains a part, is not itself a thing, but only 
possibly so; it becomes an actual thing only when it is somehow isolated 
from its environing whole. In this sense (and also in others) the substance is 
the bearer of potentiality, and it is at this point that we should have to list 
those marks of substance which flow from Aristotle’s hylomorphic theory, 
and from his theory of act and potency. 
 There are further marks of substance, less easily documented in 
Aristotle’s texts since they were taken entirely for granted in Aristotle’s day. 
These are above all: 
 (viii) A substance is independent of thinking, a part of nature – where no 
Greek would have understood what is meant by ‘independent of thinking’. 
 (ix) A substance is that which endures through some interval of time, 
however small. This means, firstly, that things exist continuously in time 
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(their existence is never intermittent). But it means also that there are no 
punctually existing things, as there are punctual processes or events (for 
example beginnings, endings, judgings, decidings, and instantaneous 
changes of other sorts).46 A thing is also typically such as to endure for such 
a length of time that it may acquire a proper name for purposes of 
reidentification.47  
 (x) A substance is that which has no temporal parts: the first ten years of 
my life are a part of my life and not a part of me. As our ordinary forms of 
language suggest, it is events and processes, not things, that have temporal 
parts. 
 Even leaving aside, now, the passages where Kotarbiński explicitly 
allies himself with Aristotle,48 the focal instances of the concept of thing 
made prominent in the Elementy make it clear that he had intended to follow 
Aristotle in almost all of the above. A body, as we have seen, is bulky and 
lasting and such as to offer resistance. Further marks of bodies distinguished 
by Kotarbiński are:  
 - They are three-dimensional.  
 - They are all and only those entities that can be investigated by science; 
every object is ‘knowable in principle’.  
 - They enjoy essential perceptibility, and are further characterised by the 
fact that they all exert influence upon perceptible objects.  
 - They are at a definite place (that is, they are at a specified spatial 
distance from certain perceptible objects), and at a specified time (that is, 
they are at a specified temporal distance from certain perceptible objects).49  
 Each of these marks is perfectly in conformity with the Aristotelian view 
expressed above. Kotarbiński’s most important departure from Aristotle, in 
the Elementy at least, is in regard to (vii). For Kotarbiński – almost certainly 
under the influence of the Leśniewskian conception of sets as concrete 
wholes – rejected the thesis that things must in every case be unitary, so that 
he counted as things also masses and quantities of things and even 
non-detached thingly parts. Bodies of air, swarms of bees, the solar system, 
are ‘compound bodies’, in Kotarbiński’s terms, as also are society, nation, 
social class and all other institutions.50  
 A lack of sensitivity to the distinction between things, masses, and parts 
seems to have been shared by a number of Polish philosophers, and may in 
some degree reflect the fact that the Polish language, with its lack of articles, 
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distinguishes less clearly than other languages between mass and count 
nouns or between mass and count uses of the same noun (‘Polish logicians 
eat little orange during War’).  
 One (Austro-)Polish philosopher who did not allow himself to be 
swayed in this way by what is, after all, a peculiarity of language, was 
Twardowski, who follows Aristotle in insisting that what he calls ‘objects of 
presentation’ are characterised in every case by the fact that they are 
integrated wholes, a thesis he extends even to the objects of general 
presentations such as Triangle, Square, Lion, etc.51 Leśniewski, in contrast, 
goes so far in rejecting the idea that to be a thing an object must in some 
sense form a natural unity, that he accepts a principle of the arbitrariness of 
thingly boundaries. This principle is built into the axioms of his system of 
Mereology, which includes a theorem to the effect that if a and b are 
objects, then so also is their sum, irrespective of whether a and b are 
connected or contiguous or materially related in any way.52 Leśniewski does 
not, of course, deny that some objects (in his highly general sense) have a 
natural unity. It is merely that he does not see the need to introduce this 
concept of natural unity into his theories of Ontology or Mereology. The 
latter are theories dealing with what he holds to be more primitive notions – 
notions which would in any case have to be clarified before a rigorous 
treatment of ‘natural unit’ could be attempted. 
 
 
§7. Truth, Correspondence and Leśniewski’s Ontology 
 
How, now, given his essentially Aristotelian ontology of things, does 
Kotarbiński cope in the Elementy with the problem of accounting in 
correspondence-theoretic terms for the truth of sentences such as ‘John is 
jumping’? Sentences of the given sort are analysed, first of all, as what 
Chisholm has called concrete predications, expressing relations between 
things.53 Thus ‘John is jumping’ is analysed as a sentence of the form: ‘John 
is a jumper’, ‘John is red’ as: ‘John is a red thing’, ‘John desires apples’ as: 
‘John is an apple-desirer’, and so on. In each case we arrive at a sentence 
containing two names of things joined together by the copula ‘is’,54 so that 
the things picked out by the names in question are to have the job of making 
true the relevant judgment.  
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 Remember, in all that follows, that ‘John is a jumper’ is to be understood 
as an analysis of the sentence ‘John is jumping’ (‘John is at present 
executing one or more jumps’). Thus we are to resist the natural tendency to 
understand nominals like ‘jumper’, ‘swimmer’, ‘bouncer’, as relating to a 
habitual or professional performance of the relevant activity. This tendency 
derives, of course, from the already mentioned fact that names are in normal 
circumstances used for purposes of re-identification; thus they presuppose 
some duration or recurrence on the part of what they name. 
 ‘John is a jumper’ accordingly analyses ‘John is, on this particular 
occasion, jumping’, where ‘is’ expresses a real continuous present. The 
thing picked out by ‘John’ seems relatively easy to identify, at least against 
the background of the broadly Aristotelian conception described above. But 
what, in the light of this conception, are we to make of the thing picked out 
by ‘a jumper’? And what is the relation between John and a jumper that is 
expressed by the copula ‘is’? 
 Our first port of call, given the strong influence exerted by Leśniewski 
on Kotarbiński’s (formally much less sophisticated) ontological views, is 
Leśniewski’s own system of Ontology, a theory built up on the basis of 
Leśniewski’s system of Protothetic or ‘theory of deduction’ by the addition 
of the new primitive term ‘is’ and the single axiom: 
 
        ∏ab [a is b ↔ ∑c (a is c & c is b)]. 
 
Colloquially: 
 
    a is b if and only if, for some c, a is c and c is b.55  
 
Here ‘a’, ‘b’ and ‘c’ are any expressions belonging to the category name. 
This means, as Leśniewski sees it, that they may be either:  
 (1) ordinary singular designating names or nominal expressions like 
‘Ronald Reagan’ or ‘the British Prime Minister’; 
 (2) shared or ‘general’ names like ‘philosophers’ or ‘apples in Vermont’. 
 (3) fictitious or empty singular names like ‘Pegasus’ or ‘the largest 
prime number’; or  
 (4) fictitious or empty general names like ‘sirens’ or ‘fates’.56  
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All such expressions belong to a single category, Leśniewski argues, since 
whether a name like ‘man at the door’ is singular or shared or empty 
depends on the factually existing state of the world, and so cannot be 
regarded as basic from the point of view of logic.57 From this, however, it 
follows also that we must admit as ‘names’ expressions like ‘jumper’, 
whose number is in a certain sense indeterminate. 
 The axiom of Ontology, now, lays down simply that for ‘a is b’ to be 
true, it must be the case that every a is b and that exactly one object is a. It is 
not difficult to show, on these terms, that if both ‘a’ and ‘b’ are singular and 
designating, then ‘a is b’ is deductively equivalent to ‘a = b’. But now, 
applied to what has now become the Polish-sounding sentence ‘John is 
jumper’, this analysis of ‘is’ tells us only that, if this sentence is true, then 
‘John’ must be a singular designating name and ‘jumper’ a designating 
name designating (possibly inter alia) what ‘John’ designates. 
 From this point of view it becomes clear that the system of Ontology is 
in fact not an ontology at all (a theory of the different types of being). 
Rather, it is a theory of names, as is reflected in Kotarbiński’s use of the 
expression ‘calculus of names’ for what Leśniewski called ‘Ontology’. 
More precisely, it is a theory of the relations of designation that hold 
between singular, shared and empty names on the one hand and objects (of 
whatever variety) on the other. It reflects a concern, therefore, not with 
problems of ontology, or metaphysics, but with the issues that arise when 
one allows ‘a’ and ‘b’ to stand in not merely for singular terms as 
straightforwardly understood but also for any expressions within the wider 
category thus defined. To put the matter another way, Ontology may be seen 
simply as an extension of the theory of identity to cope with a somewhat 
liberal view of what may count as ‘name’, so that the absolute universality 
of ‘=’ is inherited by the new Ontological ‘is’.  This makes it compatible 
with any ontology formulable by means of expressions belonging to the 
given category. As Woleński puts it, ‘Ontology is metaphysics free.’ (1987, 
p. 175)  
 If, now, we return to our sentence ‘John is jumper’ in the light of the 
Leśniewskian analysis of ‘is’, then it would appear that two alternative 
readings present themselves, according to whether we take ‘jumper’ as 
singular or plural. On the first alternative, ‘John is jumper’ will be 
equivalent to the more English-sounding ‘John is identical with a jumper’, 
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so that the referents of ‘John’ and ‘a jumper’ will be one and the same. Now 
‘John’, as we normally suppose, designates an enduring object, subject at 
different times to contradictory determinations (he is now jumping, now 
not). If, therefore, the referent of ‘a jumper’ really is to be identical to the 
referent of ‘John’, then ‘a jumper’, too, must designate something that 
endures, so that ‘John’ and ‘a jumper’ would be merely two different ways 
of referring to one and the same ordinary continuant. On this account, 
however, the truth-maker of ‘John is jumping’ would differ in no wise from 
the truth-maker of ‘John is John’, and this is an outcome which surely flies 
in the face of our intuitions to the effect that one or more jumps must 
somehow be involved in making true the given sentence. If ‘John’ and ‘a 
jumper’ are two different ways of referring to the same thing, then surely, 
our intuitions tell us, they refer to this same thing ‘under different aspects’. 
Leśniewskian Ontology is however so lacking in discrimination in its 
treatment of ‘things’, that it is able to take no account at all of such 
‘different aspects’.  
 What, then, as regards the second alternative, which would make ‘John 
is jumper’ equivalent to: ‘John is one among the jumpers’. Since from any 
sentence of the form ‘a is one of the bs’, one can infer within Ontology a 
sentence which might be rendered colloquially as ‘a is this b’, where ‘this b’ 
is a singular name for that individual b which a is, this second reading might 
seem to bring us back once more to the first alternative, which we have seen 
reason to reject. We may, however, be able to infer from ‘John is one among 
the jumpers’ also that there are jumpers to which John himself stands in the 
relation of similarity. And now, since John’s circle of similars qua jumper is 
different from his circle of similars qua thinker, this may enable the reist to 
distinguish separate truth-makers for ‘John is thinking’ and ‘John is 
jumping’ even in those cases where the two activities are performed 
simultaneously. From this it would follow that the family of jumping things 
contributes in some way to making it true that John, in particular, is jumping 
– a consequence which certainly goes beyond what Leśniewski himself had 
to say on these matters, but which nevertheless has advantages from the reist 
point of view (to the extent that it has been found acceptable by Lejewski). 
In particular, it enables the reist to distinguish the truth-makers of ‘John is 
jumping’ and ‘John is thinking’ even in those circumstances where jumping 
and thinking are simultaneous: other jumpers contribute to making true the 
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former sentence in a way in which they do not contribute to making true the 
latter. 
 
 
§8. Time and Tense 
 
This is not quite all that can be said on Leśniewski’s behalf, however, and 
before returning to our discussion of Kotarbiński’s own ontological views it 
will be useful to look at the Leśniewskian treatment of the phenomena of 
verbal tense. Recall that the ‘is’ in ‘John is jumping’ is intended to express a 
real present tense. The Polish ‘jest’, on the other hand, for example in ‘Jan 
jest skaczący’ (John is jumping) – a form which sounds odd due to the 
absence in Polish of the continuous aspect – does not express a present 
tense, and this holds too of ‘Jan skacze’ (John jumps) and ‘Jan jest 
skoczkiem’ (John is a jumper). 
 In and of itself the Polish ‘is’ is timeless. In order to mark the fact that 
the jumping is taking place at the moment, the speaker of Polish must add an 
explicit temporal index and say, for example, ‘Jan teraz skacze’ (John jumps 
now) or (more stiltedly) ‘Jan jest teraz skaczący’ (John is now a jumper). 
This timelessness, we now see, must be characteristic also of the ‘is’ of 
Leśniewski’s Ontology. This is first of all because Leśniewski insisted that 
the sentences of Ontology should be absolutely true, i.e. true independently 
of time and occasion of utterance.58 But it is also because, as already noted, 
the ‘is’ of Ontology is to enjoy absolute universality of scope; it is to  be 
applicable to abstracta as much as to concreta, to objects past and future as 
much as to objects of the present. It is in fact the same timeless ‘is’ as that 
which we employ when we say, e.g., ‘Socrates is a philosopher’ or ‘3 is a 
prime number’ or ‘whales are mammals’.  
 Ontology is not, however, restricted to ‘timeless’ sentences of the given 
sort. Return, for the moment, to ‘Jan jest teraz skaczący’ (John is now 
jumping). We should normally interpret the temporal index (‘now’ or 
‘teraz’) in such a sentence as governing the verb. Given the universality of 
scope of Ontology, however, and of the category name with which it deals, 
it is open to us to allow such temporal indices to govern not the verb but the 
subject of the sentence.59 This yields sentences of the form ‘Johnteraz jest 
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skaczący’ or ‘Johnnow is a jumper’ – sentences of a sort which make possible 
a new Leśniewskian reading of our original ‘John is a jumper’. 
 ‘Johnnow’ is a name, like any other; but a name of what? We shall think 
of it, for the moment, as designating a phase of John, remaining neutral as to 
what exactly this might mean and recalling only that any view of phases as 
temporal parts of things would signify a departure from the Aristotelian 
conception of ‘thing’ outlined above. We shall for the moment presuppose 
only (1) that some of the phases of John are jumping phases, some not; and 
(2) that phases exist only for some (normally relatively short) interval (or 
instant) of time. 
 Someone who asserts that John is a jumper, now, may be seen as 
asserting that a present phase of John is a jumping phase of John – with a 
timeless ‘is’, exactly as dictated by the conditions laid down by Leśniewski 
on the sentences of his Ontology. The notion of a present phase of John may 
be elucidated in turn as: a phase of John that is simultaneous with the 
utterance in question, i.e., in reist terms, with the relevant phase of the 
speaker.60 The advantage of a reading of this sort is that we now have no 
need to regard ‘a jumper’ as the name of an enduring object. The identity of 
the referents of ‘John’ and ‘a jumper’ is assured, rather, by the fact that 
‘John’ itself has come to refer to an entity which enjoys a merely transient 
existence.  
 
 
§9. Phases in the Development of Reism 
 
Does this really help, however, in understanding what it is that makes true 
the sentence ‘John is a jumper’? For what is this ‘phase’ of John that is both 
John and a jumper? There are, it will turn out, a number of crucial 
difficulties which we face in establishing what such phases might be. Most 
importantly, as already remarked, it seems that however this issue is decided 
the phase ontology will dictate a departure from the broadly Aristotelian 
conception of ‘thing’, in spite of Kotarbiński’s apparent assumption that this 
ontology represents a natural and inconsequential extrapolation of the reistic 
ontology of things.61  
 There are, be it noted, no phases in Kotarbiński’s Elementy, and that 
Kotarbiński held to a strictly Aristotelian view in this work is seen above all 
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in the fact that – as his examples show – he takes it for granted there that 
things may change, in the sense that what is true of a given thing at one time 
may be false of that same thing at another. In his paper of 1935, "The 
Fundamental Ideas of Pansomatism", in contrast, Kotarbiński embraces the 
phase ontology seemingly without a second thought. Every object, he 
writes, 
 
 is something corporeal or something sentient (or a whole consisting of such 
components). An example of something corporeal is: a watch of the trademark 
Omega No. 3945614 from 1st January, 1934 to 31st December, 1934, inclusive (or 
any of its parts – for instance, the minute hand from 5th March, 1934 to 7th April, 
1934, inclusive). And an example of something sentient: I, from 8 o’clock to 1 
o’clock on 20th March, 1935 (or any temporal portion of this object, e.g., I, from 9 
o’clock to 10 o’clock inclusive on the same day). (1935, p. 488)  
 
Hence at least one further stage needs to be added to the list of ‘stages’ in 
the development of reism given above. This consists in the transition from 
an essentially Aristotelian ontology on Kotarbiński’s part in the period up to 
1931, to a quite different ontology of phases (or mixed ontology of phases 
and substances) in the years thereafter.   
 How this apparently unconscious change of mind on Kotarbiński’s part 
came about can be seen if we look at the final section of Leśniewski’s work 
“On the Foundations of Mathematics”. Here Leśniewski begins by 
expressing his gratification that so many of his own views, especially in 
connection with the system of Ontology, had found support in Kotarbiński’s 
work.62 Leśniewski goes on to quote extensively from the Elementy, 
including the famous passage in which Kotarbiński compares Leśniewski’s 
work to that of Aristotle, thereby providing a retrospective justification for 
Leśniewski’s use of the term ‘Ontology’– a justification which Leśniewski 
himself was only too willing to accept.63 For a long time, Kotarbiński writes, 
the term ‘ontology’ 
 
 has come to designate investigations of the ‘general principles of being’ conducted 
in the spirit of certain parts of the Aristotelian ‘metaphysical’ books. However, it 
should be noted that if the Aristotelian definition of First Philosophy, perhaps the 
main concern of these books, is interpreted in the spirit of a ‘general theory of 
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objects’, then both the word and its meaning are applicable to the calculus of names 
as conceived by Leśniewski. (1966, pp. 210f.)64  
 
In the paragraphs which follow this discussion of Kotarbiński, however, 
Leśniewski goes on to consider a certain difficulty for Ontology posed by 
the colloquial reading of Ontological sentences of the form ‘a is b’, and it is 
in this context that he first introduces his notion of phase or ‘temporal 
segment’.  
 Let us suppose, Leśniewski writes, that someone were to assert:  
 
 (a) Warsaw is older than the Saxon Gardens 
 (b) Warsaw in 1830 is smaller than Warsaw in 1930 
 (c) Warsaw in 1930 is Warsaw 
 (d) Warsaw in 1830 is Warsaw.  
 
Then, taken together with the axiom of ontology, we can derive from these 
sentences the following assertion:  
 
 (e) Warsaw in 1930 is smaller than Warsaw in 1930, 
 
which is absurd.  
 In his response to this objection Leśniewski insists, first of all, that the 
expression ‘Warsaw’ be used consistently throughout. Either, he claims, it 
should be used to refer to ‘only one object having a definite time span, 
which at present we do not know’, in which case it has the sense of ‘Warsaw 
from the beginning to the end of its existence’. Or it should be used in such 
a way that it refers to indefinitely many different objects, so that it would be 
possible to assert “of ‘Warsaw from the beginning to the end of its 
existence’ as well as of ‘Warsaw in 1930’ and of ‘Warsaw in 1830’...that 
they are Warsaws.” Moreover, “it would be possible to say with complete 
generality that if some object is Warsaw, and some other object is a 
temporal segment of the first object, then the second object is also 
Warsaw.”65  
 On the first reading, now, which sees ‘Warsaw’ as a singular name, “it is 
not possible to call by the name ‘Warsaw’ any temporal segment or 
temporal ‘section’ of the unique Warsaw referred to”. In this case we shall 
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be able to assert neither (b) nor (c) nor (d). On the second reading, on the 
other hand, ‘Warsaw’ is a plural name, which means that we shall find it 
impossible to assert any sentence of the form (a). Only on the basis of some 
such sentence, however, can we infer the consequence (e). Whichever 
alternative is chosen, therefore, the supposed absurd implication can be 
avoided. 
 We may infer, now, that Kotarbiński, wishing to keep in step with 
Leśniewski in this, as in other matters of Ontology, simply took over the 
notion of temporal phase, going so far as to accept arbitrary temporal phases 
of an object as of fully equal status with that object itself. Closer 
examination of the relevant passage reveals that Leśniewski himself is here 
more circumspect. Thus he accepts the greater appropriateness of talking not 
so much of the temporal segment of the rector of the University of Warsaw 
in January, 1923 but rather of the man (‘from the beginning to the end of 
the existence of this man’) who was in January, 1923 the rector of the 
University of Warsaw. Further, he has “the inclination to use the expression 
‘Warsaw’ as a name denoting one object only”. Since, however, he is using 
‘man’ and similar expressions to designate simply the relevant maximal 
phase (‘man, from the beginning to the end of his existence’), it seems that 
Leśniewski is even here embracing the phase ontology, though in a form 
which seeks to come to terms with the fact that the ontology in question 
threatens conflict with our ordinary usage. 
 
 
§10. What are Phases? 
 
Certainly we refer quite naturally to Napoleon in his youth, to Nixon during 
the period of his presidency, to the later Wittgenstein, and so on. Normally, 
however, we take such expressions in their sentential contexts, as signifying 
for example that Napoleon himself was such and such in his youth.  That is, 
we treat expressions like ‘in his youth’ as adverbial modifications of the 
relevant verb. The phase ontologist, in contrast, takes such forms of speech 
to sanction the view that there are special objects, Napoleon in his youth, 
Nixon during the period of his presidency, and so on, which are temporal 
parts of Napoleon and Nixon respectively (‘from the beginning to the end of 
their existence’). Objects are therefore seen as having temporal parts in just 
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the way that they have spatial parts like arms and legs. Thus where common 
sense and Aristotle prefer a view according to which things (for example 
people) exist in toto in any given moment of their existence, the phase 
ontologist seems to condone a view according to which only the relevant 
temporal parts of things would exist in any given moment. He may thereby 
be driven to the view that temporal parts must be in every case 
instantaneous, for any temporal part of duration longer than a single instant 
would have just as little claim to exist in that instant as would the relevant 
temporal whole. Adoption of the phase ontology may thereby lead to a view 
of ordinary things as mere entia successiva, the separate ‘momentary slices’ 
of which would exist in successive instants of time (as, according to some 
philosophers, the world as a whole has to be recreated anew by God in each 
successive instant). An enduring thing, on this view, is a mere logical 
construction upon the various instantaneously existing entities that may be 
said to do duty for it.66  
 Alternatively, however, the phase ontologist may seek to understand 
‘Johnnow’ as signifying John himself, exactly as understood within the 
Aristotelian theory, but restricted to some interval of time (t,t’) which 
includes the present moment.67 If, however, as is required by the Aristotelian 
theory, John exists in toto in every moment of his existence, then it must 
surely follow, according to a process of reasoning encountered already 
above, that John(t,t’) is in fact identical with John himself. To get round this 
problem the phase ontologist might seek to regard ‘John(t,t’)’ as referring to 
John as he would have been had the universe (conceived as being in other 
respects identical to the actual universe) begun at t and ended at t’. 
(‘Napoleon in his youth’, on a view of this sort, might be understood as 
referring to Napoleon as he would have been had he ceased to exist on the 
point of reaching maturity.) This, however, would make of phases merely 
possible existents. It would leave us in the dark as to the referent of 
‘John(t,t’)’ in this, the actual world and it would tell us nothing as to the 
relation, if any, between John(t,t’) and John himself. 
 Leśniewski’s own motivation in introducing the notion of temporal 
segment seems to have derived on the one hand from his timeless 
conception of truth, and on the other hand from those physical theories (of 
‘spacetime’, ‘world lines’, and so on) which have grown out of the idea that 
there is a certain analogy between the spatial and temporal dimensions of 
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the entities treated of by physics.68 We shall assume, then, that on the 
Leśniewskian view we are to regard each object as a four-dimensional 
whole, capable of being cut up into parts in any of its four dimensions. 
Phases result when objects are sliced in the temporal dimension. Why, now, 
must such a view embody a conception of the way in which the 
spatiotemporal world is parcelled into separate entities that is in conflict 
with the Aristotelian ontology of things? To answer this question we must 
understand what it is for an object to change (to admit contrary accidents at 
different times). Consider, to this end, the following passage from Zemach’s 
important paper “Four Ontologies” of 1970: 
  
 An ontology may construe its entities as either bound or continuous in time and in 
space. An entity that is continuous in a certain dimension is an entity that is not 
considered to have parts in the dimension in which it is continuous. It can be said to 
change or not to change in this dimension, but what is to be found further along in 
this dimension is the whole entity as changed (or unchanged) and not a certain part 
thereof. The opposite is true of an entity’s being bound. If an entity is bound in a 
certain dimension, then the various locations along this dimension contain its parts, 
not the whole entity again.  (Zemach 1970, pp. 231f.)  
 
Thus the Aristotelian substance ontology is an ontology which sees 
substances as, in Zemach’s terms, continuant in time and bound in space. 
We see the same substance again on successive occasions, not a different 
slice thereof.69 The four-dimensionalist phase ontology, in contrast, is one 
which sees entities as bound both in space and in time, i.e. as having both 
spatial and temporal parts. Entities so conceived are excluded entirely from 
change. That a four-dimensional whole has red phases and green phases no 
more signifies a change, than does the fact that my pen is at one end red and 
at the other end green. 
 Interestingly, now, the term proposed by Zemach for the four-
dimensional wholes that are accepted by Leśniewski is the term event: 
  
 An event is an entity that exists, in its entirety, in the area defined by its 
spatiotemporal boundaries, and each part of this area contains a part of the whole 
event. There are obviously indefinitely many ways to carve the world into events, 
some of which are useful and interesting (e.g. for the physicist) and some of which – 
the vast majority – seem to us to create hodge-podge collections of no interest 
whatsoever. Any filled chunk of spacetime is an event... When philosophers and 
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physicists talk about spatiotemporal worms, about point-events, or about 
world-lines, when they describe material things as ‘lazy processes’ and refer to 
spatial and temporal slices of entities, they are using the language of this [event] 
ontology. (Zemach 1970, p. 233)  
  
Now it is no mere terminological matter to suggest that the phase ontology 
brings us close to an ontology of events. Indeed, Leśniewski himself, while 
critical of the specific formal treatment of the event ontology that is given 
by Whitehead,70 seems to have been not too negatively disposed to the idea 
that objects and events may constitute a single category. The whole tone of 
Kotarbiński’s Elementy, however, is precisely counter to an outcome of this 
sort, and there is not a little irony in the fact that Kotarbiński (like Lejewski 
in our own day) sees no incongruity in doing away with events via 
‘onomatoids’, and then (apparently) resurrecting them via temporal parts.  
 Certainly Leśniewski does not countenance anything like the dissolution 
of things into events or processes that was envisioned by, say, Heraclitus, 
Schopenhauer or Bergson. For not every four-dimensional whole is such as 
to count as a ‘thing’ from Leśniewski’s point of view. His reasoning seems 
to have been, rather, that it is possible to restrict the totality of 
four-dimensional wholes in such a way that the resulting ontology will 
remain more or less in keeping with our presuppositions concerning things 
or concreta. Thus, we might say, a four-dimensional whole, before it can be 
admitted by Leśniewski into his ontology, must satisfy the two-fold 
condition that it be (1) ‘bulky and lasting’ (i.e. extended in all its four 
dimensions) and ‘such as to offer resistance’, and also (2) such that all its 
(bulky and lasting) parts are resistant in the relevant sense.71  It is, however, 
far from clear that such conditions can of themselves suffice to transform an 
ontology of four-dimensional wholes into an ontology of ‘things’ in the 
sense of the reist. Indeed, there is a suspicion that they involve a 
surreptitious smuggling in of the goal to be achieved (not least because the 
phrase ‘offers resistance’ seems to belong still to the language of 
continuants or substances).  
 Not merely does the phase ontology have no room for change. It 
precludes also any account of what we might refer to as the ‘stability’ of 
enduring substances. As W. E. Johnson points out, the ontology of 
four-dimensional wholes springs from that post-Humean doctrine which 
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regards change as fictitious and substitutes for it ‘merely differently 
characterised phenomena referred to non-identical dates.’ It may be that for 
most scientific purposes ‘no more transcendental conception than that of a 
whole constituted by the binding relations of time and space is required; and 
hence the philosophers who reject the conception of a continuant are 
satisfied to replace it by the notion of such an extensional whole.’ What, 
however, is to explain, on this account, the stability of that spatiotemporal 
nexus which connects, for example, the successive ‘phases’ of a living 
organism? As Johnson argues, a mere succession of processes ‘offers no 
explanation whatever of what in objective reality determines the stability of 
any given nexus.’ (Johnson 1924, pp. 100f.) 
 
 
§11. In Defence of a Bicategorial Ontology 
 
There is an assumption running through the thought of Leśniewski, 
Kotarbiński and their followers, as also through that of Zemach, to the effect 
that the most worthy aim of the ontologist is that of producing a 
monocategorial ontology – and more generally of demonstrating that one or 
other sort of eliminative reduction can be achieved. A more natural 
resolution of the problems raised in our reflections on time and change, and 
on tensed predications like ‘John is jumping’, is achieved, however, if we 
abandon this concern with reduction and embrace instead a shamefacedly 
bicategorial ontology of things and events, the latter being conceived as 
changes in things, as dependent particulars (after the fashion of, say, 
accidents in the category of action as these are conceived in the Aristotelian 
ontology).72 Events, we can say, occur in or between things, and are no less 
individual than these things themselves. They may be instantaneous or 
extended in time, and in the latter case they have temporal parts which are 
themselves events. On this basis we can now go on to distinguish clearly 
between a thing, on the one hand, as something that is given in toto from the 
very first moment of its existence, and the ‘life’ or ‘history’ of this thing on 
the other hand, as a certain type of complex event, bound up inseparably 
with the thing whose history it is. The purported temporal parts of things 
will then turn out to be parts of such complex events, so that the cleavage 
between John as child and John as adult can be recognised, 
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commensensically, as a cleavage not in John, but in his life or history. Note, 
incidentally that there is no comparable move in regard to spatial parts. We 
cannot say that these are really parts of a substance’s shape, for example, or 
of the space a substance occupies. 
 Clearly, the ontology of things and events provides a peculiarly simple 
account of what makes ‘John is jumping’ true. More interesting, perhaps, is 
the fact that this same ontology can account for certain properties of the 
linguistic phenomena of verbal aspect,73  properties which are important for 
us here in that they reflect a parallel on the side of the verb to the opposition 
among nouns between ‘mass’ and ‘count’ (as for example between ‘sugar’ 
and ‘snow’ on the one hand, and ‘tiger’ and ‘ox’ on the other). The former 
correspond to verbs of progressive and continuous aspect (‘John knows how 
to jump’, ‘John’s been jumping all day’), the latter to verbs of achievement 
(‘John jumped over the ridge’, ‘John just jumped to victory’).  
 What this tells us in ontological terms is that the opposition between 
what is ‘unitary’ and what is ‘mass’ or ‘collective’ is to be found not merely 
in the realm of things but in the realm of events, too, though in an 
interestingly more complex form. For while events of reddening or 
exploding or whistling, as well as institutional affairs such as weddings, 
funerals and runnings of races, are all such that they have or could have 
temporal parts, they may also – by inheritance from the (moving and 
extended) things which support them – be extended in space. Hence they 
may participate in the opposition between ‘unity’ and ‘mass’ in two distinct 
dimensions: events may be spread out either in time, or in space, or of 
course in both. 
 Consider, for example, the process of jumping. This is made up, we may 
suppose, of minimal unitary temporal parts – which we may call ‘jumps’ – 
comparable to ‘substances’ in the world of things. Each jump may then be 
analysed in turn as a continuum of bodily movements of a certain sort.  
 We can distinguish, in the world of things, not only what might be called 
‘substantial’ parts (lumps of sugar, molecules of water), but also atomic 
parts, which are marked by the fact that they have no parts of their own. 
This distinction, too, can be drawn in the realm of events, where we can 
distinguish on the one hand unitary events which take time but have no 
homogeneous sub- events as parts, for example judgings, decidings, and so 
on, and on the other hand events which are strictly punctual, such as 
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beginnings, endings and instantaneous changes.74  Leśniewski’s Ontology 
and Mereology, now, have shown themselves surprisingly adept at coping in 
a formally rigorous way with relations such as this in so far as these are 
manifested among things. Truth, however, is a relation which involves not 
only things and the names of things. It involves also verbs and that in reality 
to which verbs correspond, which is typically an event of one or other sort. 
Hence we can begin to understand why it is that the bicategorial ontology 
may be particularly suited to the task of giving an account of what makes 
sentences (particularly empirical sentences) true. For it allows us to take 
account of just those differences in reality which are reflected in language in 
the differences of verbal aspect (differences which are preserved, 
incidentally, even if we move over to a language shorn of tenses, of the sort 
that was favoured by Twardowski, Leśniewski, and other proponents of the 
‘absolute’ theory of truth). 
    
 
§12. Qualitative Extensions 
 
Return, however, to the properly reistic ontology and to our original pair of 
questions: what is the referent of ‘a jumper’ in ‘John is a jumper’, and what 
is the relation between John and a jumper that is expressed by the copula 
‘is’? Our goal was to provide answers to these questions in monocategorial 
terms in a way that would tell us what things make ‘John is a jumper’ true. 
Kotarbiński’s Elementy, at a number of points, suggests an answer to this 
question that comes interestingly close to simulating the effects of the 
bicategorial ontology of things and events discussed above. This answer, 
which is nowhere to be found in Leśniewski, rests on the idea that ‘is’ in the 
given sentence expresses a special kind of relation of part to whole. ‘A 
jumper’ – or what might how be called ‘jumping John’ – is, on this reading, 
the name of a special sort of transiently existing thing, in which John 
himself is included as part. The idea here is that things may at certain times 
exist as it were in a raw state, but that they may on occasions extend 
themselves qualitatively, or become modified in certain ways (by what the 
tradition called ‘accidents’ or ‘modes’), so that John, for example, may on 
occasions become jumping John or cursing John or sleeping John, and so 
on. John himself will survive in each of the latter – though of course, 
BARRY SMITH 150 
because of the semantic restrictions imposed by Kotarbiński, we cannot 
isolate that which gets added to John to yield the various ‘qualitative 
extensions’ in which he may partake.  
 It is more than anything else Kotarbiński’s examples that suggest this 
qualitative extension view. Thus he tells us that ‘it is obvious that only 
things are stimuli: burning flames, sounding strings, pressing solids, etc.’ 
(1966, pp. 434f.), and these are examples which seem to imply not only that 
Kotarbiński is intending to refer to things that can survive and acquire and 
lose accidental determinations in something like the Aristotelian sense, but 
also that the result of a thing’s acquiring an accidental determination may be 
a new thing, qualitatively extending the thing with which we began: a string 
becomes a sounding string, solids become pressing solids, a match becomes 
a lighted match, and so on. The qualitative extension view allows, 
moreover, a particularly simple interpretation of Kotarbiński’s views on 
psychology: a thinker is a body that is qualitatively extended in a special 
(deliberating, worrying, deciding) sort of way. There is not only jumping 
John, but also thinking John, hoping John, dreaming John, and so on.  
 Even after the Elementy there are hints of this qualitative extension view 
in Kotarbiński’s treatment of words and sentences as things. Thus consider 
the following passage from a piece first published in 1954: 
  
 a linguistic sign is for us a physical body, whether it is a graphic sign or an acoustic 
sign (in the latter case it is a certain amount of air vibrating in a specified way); thus 
it is a thing, and not a process in the sense of a specified changing of something. 
(1966, p. 399, emphasis added) 
 
The same amount of air, considered as enduring thing, is vibrating now in 
this way, now in that, and it is a different ‘acoustic sign’ in the two 
successive cases. As such passages reveal, however, there are certain 
consequences of the qualitative extension view that run counter to our 
commonsense understanding of ‘thing’. For things, now, include not only 
Tom and Dick, but also Tom-the-jumper, Dick-the-thinker; not only 
quantities-of-air but also quantities-of-air-vibrating-in-a-certain-way. Note, 
however, that while qualitatively extended things may exist for a very short 
time, so that they typically do not acquire special (proper) names of their 
own for purposes of re-identification, it seems that all the qualitatively 
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extended things seemingly admitted en passant by Kotarbiński do have 
some duration, however short (so that their existence is never punctual, 
though it may be intermittent). This reflects, perhaps, the acceptability of 
names like ‘dying Jim’, ‘racing Tom’, etc., where ‘ending-his-process-of-
dying Jim’ or ‘beginning-to-run-a-race Tom’ are ungrammatical. 
 Of course not all complex names of the given sorts need be given the 
qualitative extension interpretation. Thus it may be that Leśniewski can 
entirely avoid this interpretation by means of his ‘phases’ (though again, it is 
difficult to see how this ploy will allow us to distinguish for example 
‘jumping John’ from ‘cursing John’ when jump and curse are simultaneous). 
Moreover, there are cases of expressions of the form ‘—ing N’ or ‘—ed N’ 
where ‘N’ is a bona fide name but the ‘—ing’ or ‘—ed’ a merely modifying 
adjective which brings about a diminution or cancelling of the content 
expressed by ‘N’. Consider expressions like ‘missing arm’, ‘assassinated 
president’, ‘shattered vase’, ‘annihilated electron’, and so on.75  
 The qualitative extension view does however give us an elegant account 
of what makes sentences like ‘John is a jumper’ true, in a way that involves 
reference exclusively to things. John himself and his qualitative extension 
are not identical; the former is a part of the latter. Note, however, that there 
is no third thing which, when added to the former would yield the latter. 
Hence the usual mereological remainder principle fails to hold. The idea of a 
mereological theory in which the remainder principle is weakened, or even 
suspended, is far from incoherent, as a number of algebraic parallels 
testify.76 This failure of the remainder principle will however suffice to 
render the qualitative extension view unacceptable in the eyes of 
Leśniewski’s more devoted disciples.  
 
 
§13. Kotarbiński and Brentano 
 
The interest of the view in question is for us largely historical. There are 
traces of the idea of qualitative extension in Aristotle, for example in the 
passages in the Metaphysics where Aristotle raises the question whether 
Coriscus and musical Coriscus are one and the same.77 Its first coherent 
defence is however given by Brentano: 
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 Among the entities that have parts, there are some whose whole is not composed of 
a multiplicity of parts; it appears much rather as an enrichment of a part, though not 
as a result of the addition of a second part. One example of such an entity is a 
thinking soul. It ceases to think and yet remains the same soul. But when it starts to 
think again no second thing is added to that entity which is the soul. What we have 
here, then, is not like what we have when one stone is laid alongside another or 
when we double the size of a body... The substance is a thing and the accidentally 
extended substance is again a thing, though but a thing not wholly other in relation 
to the substance; hence we do not have that kind of addition of one and one that 
leads to a plurality. (Brentano 1933, pp. 53f., Eng. pp. 47f.)  
  
Return, for the moment, to our list of ‘stages’ in the development of reism. 
Stage 5 in this development was provoked by a letter Kotarbiński received 
from Twardowski in 1929 on the publication of the first edition of the 
Elementy, in which Twardowski pointed out that the doctrine of reism had 
been propounded already some years earlier in a series of pieces dictated by 
Brentano towards the end of his life and appended to the second edition of 
his Psychologie.78 Kotarbiński, in response, came to see the need to add to 
his reflections on reism a certain historical dimension. Above all he began to 
stress the difference between his own pansomatist views and the reistic 
views he attributed to Brentano. In his paper on “Brentano as Reist” of 
1966, Kotarbiński points out further that Leibniz, too, could be viewed as a 
precursor of reism, not only in the light of his monadology but also in 
reflection of his principle that all formulations containing names of abstract 
objects should be avoided. Kotarbiński sees himself, however, as the only 
‘consistent and conscious’ somatist reist. He describes Leibniz as a 
‘spiritualist reist’, i.e. as one who accepts souls or spirits as the only type of 
things. Brentano he describes as a dualist reist who accepted into his 
ontology both bodies (res extensa) and souls (res cogitans): ‘As a former 
priest, [Brentano] stopped at the threshold of somatism and never crossed 
it.’ (1966, p. 428.) We shall investigate below the extent to which this is an 
adequate account of Brentano’s reism and of its relation to that of 
Kotarbiński. 
 Brentano, familiarly, distinguishes three sorts of ways in which a subject 
may be conscious of an object in his mental acts: in presentation, in 
judgments and in what he calls ‘phenomena of love and hate’, a category 
embracing feelings, emotions and all other value or interest phenomena. In 
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presentation the subject is conscious of the object, has it before his mind, 
without taking up any position with regard to it. The object is neither 
accepted as existing nor rejected as non-existing, neither loved as having 
value nor hated as having disvalue. A judgment arises when, to this simple 
manner of being related to an object in presentation, there is added one of 
two diametrically opposed modes of relating to this object, which we might 
call acceptance and rejection or ‘belief’ and ‘disbelief’. A judgment is in 
effect either the affirmation or the denial of existence of an object given in 
presentation, so that Brentano embraces a view according to which all 
judgments are reducible to judgments of existential form.79 A positive 
judgment is true if the object of the underlying presentation exists; a 
negative judgment is true if this object fails to exist.  
 The early Brentanian ontology of ‘things’ or ‘objects’ arises, now, when 
one turns from the psychology of presentation to an investigation of the 
non-psychological correlates of presenting acts. ‘Object’ is accordingly to 
be understood as: ‘possible correlate of presentation’; it is a term whose 
meaning we can understand only by reflecting on the meaning of the term 
‘presentation’, the latter term itself being such that we grasp its meaning 
directly on the basis of our own intuitive experience of our acts of 
presentation.80  
 According to Brentano’s earlier view, there exist non-real objects (‘entia 
rationis’, later called ‘entia irrealia’) of  various kinds – mental contents or 
‘objects of thought’, universals, states of affairs, possibilities, lacks and so 
on – all of which can be given in presentation and affirmed or denied in 
judgment. This points to a distinction, accepted by the early Brentano and 
his followers, between the existence or non-existence of an object of 
presentation on the one hand, and its reality or non-reality on the other. Thus 
what exists (for example values or universals) need not be real, and what is 
real (for example centaurs or chunks of wooden metal, and even the objects 
of simple acts of sensation) need not exist. These two oppositions, Brentano 
held, are independent of each other, and only the former is involved directly 
in the correctness or incorrectness of a judgment.81   
 Later, however, Brentano moved to a view according to which ‘reality’ 
and ‘existence’ would be equivalent, so that everything which exists is an 
ens reale. Brentano’s change of mind occurred, in fact, during the period 
when Kotarbiński was studying in Lvov. However, it was initially made 
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known only to Brentano’s closest associates, so that we can rule out any 
influence of Brentano’s later view on Kotarbiński via his teacher 
Twardowski. Kotarbiński’s and Brentano’s thing-ontologies may however 
have a common source. Thus it is noteworthy that both views arose, in part 
at least, in reaction to certain apparent ontological excesses of Brentano’s 
students, not least of Twardowski himself, a reaction which led in both cases 
to a reversion to an ontology rooted effectively in the Aristotelian 
conception of thing or ‘first substance’. Moreover, as Ingarden pointed out 
already in the early thirties, there is a sense in which the roots of both 
Brentano’s and Kotarbiński’s reism are present already in Brentano’s own 
earlier existential theory of judgment, since – when once ‘Sachverhalte’ or 
‘facts’ have come to appear suspicious – this has the effect of reducing each 
judgment to a form which asserts either the existence or the non-existence of 
some object:82   
  
 It is not that the being of A must come into being in order for the judgment ‘A is’ to 
be transformed from one that is incorrect to one that is correct; all that is needed is 
A. And the non-being of A need not come into being in order for the judgment ‘A is 
not’ to be transformed from one that is incorrect to one that is correct; all that is 
required is that A cease to be. And if only this happened and nothing else... would 
there not be in this fact alone, which relates to what is real, everything that is needed 
for the correctness of my judgment? Without doubt... And thus the doctrine of the 
existence of such non-things has nothing whatever in its favour. (Brentano 1930, p. 
95, Eng. p. 85)  
  
It is important, however, to be clear as to the precise nature of the respective 
views of Brentano and Kotarbiński. Brentano came to believe that all 
objects belong to a single category, the category of ens reale or Realitäten.83 
The fact that he sometimes uses the word ‘thing’ [Ding] to refer to the 
entities in this category of itself tells us little as to the extent to which he 
shared with Kotarbiński tenets of the latter’s reism.  
 Certainly there are a number of sometimes striking similarities between 
their respective philosophies: 
 They agree, first of all, on negatives: for both philosophers, only 
concrete individuals exist. There are no abstracta, no universals or general 
objects, no properties, classes, meanings or concepts,84 Brentano’s motive 
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for rejecting all such entities being rooted in his conviction that all that 
exists is completely determined, down to lowest differences. 
 Secondly, they agree as to the importance of the dimension of semantic 
or linguistic analysis as a complement to ontology: the apparent 
grammatical form of an expression is not always its actual or ultimate form. 
They agree also in the view that this actual form is to be achieved by 
translation into the language of things.85  
 Thirdly, and most importantly, Brentano agrees with Kotarbiński (and 
against Aristotle) in allowing collectives of things to count as things. 
Organisms, for Brentano, are collectives in this sense. Further, neither 
philosopher takes seriously the requirement that things should form a unity:  
  
 By that which is when the expression is used in the strict sense, we understand a 
thing...; a number of things taken together may certainly also be called a thing, 
though one must not suppose that the two parts of a thing taken together constitute 
an additional third thing. For where we have an addition, the things that are added 
must have no parts in common. (1933, p. 4, Eng. p. 16)  
 
Similarly they agree in allowing parts of things to count as things. Hence 
both are ‘actualists’, in the sense that they believe that a part of something 
actually real is itself actually real even when it is a part. Aristotle, in 
contrast, may be referred to as a ‘potentialist’, in the sense that he holds that 
parts of things are as such only potentially real.86 Neither in Brentano nor in 
Kotarbiński, we can say, do we find any trace of the Aristotelian theory of 
act and potency and of the hylomorphic conception of substances to which it 
led. 
 
 
§14. Formal vs. Material Ontology 
 
The points of disagreement between the two philosophers derive especially 
from the fact that Kotarbiński starts out with the idea that physical bodies 
are the prime examples of things, and sees ‘resistance’ or the ability to stand 
in causal relations as a distinguishing mark of the concept thing. For 
Brentano, on the other hand, the concept thing, a concept which grew out of 
his earlier psychological doctrine of ‘objects of presentation’ does not 
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essentially have to do with the concept of causality (with the opposition 
between what is inert or energetic and what is non-inert or anergetic). And 
even though things as Brentano conceives them are not, except in special 
cases, psychological entities, there is nevertheless a sense in which even on 
this latter doctrine the term ‘thing’ is a psychological term.  
 This is shown most clearly in the different arguments the two 
philosophers bring forward to defend their respective views. Brentano’s 
argument for the ontology of ens reale rests on the fact that the univocity of 
‘presentation’ implies the univocity of ‘thing’.87 Kotarbiński’s argument for 
his own reistic ontology, in contrast, is negative in form, resting on the 
unacceptability (for a variety of reasons) of theses to the effect that there 
exist universals, facts, classes and the like.88   
 The Brentanian concept of thing is, we might say, a formal concept. It is, 
in other words, a concept capable of applying without reservation to objects 
in all material categories – since, for Brentano, objects in all material 
categories may serve as objects of presentation.89 And then: 
  
 It doesn’t matter at all what word we use to refer to the concept which is common to 
all that is to be presented. Whether we speak of ‘thing’ or ‘entity’, it is enough that it 
represents a highest universal to which we attain by means of the highest degree of 
abstraction no matter where we look (1930, p. 108, Eng. p.96). 
 
Aquinas, too, sees the concept of a thing or of what is real as the most 
general concept to which reason can attain,90 and a broadly similar view is 
present for example in Husserl’s Philosophie der Arithmetik, where the 
purely formal concept of an Etwas or ‘something’ lies at the basis of 
Husserl’s theory of number and counting. 
 For Kotarbiński, on the other hand, ‘thing’ is a term of material 
ontology, to be understood by reflecting on specific sorts of examples of 
thing and on the meanings of terms like ‘bulky’, ‘extended’, ‘inert’, and so 
on, whose significance is confined to the region of physical bodies. 
 Marty is in this respect closer to Kotarbiński than he is to Brentano, 
since he pursued energetically the idea that the concept of thing or ens reale 
should be confined to those entities which participate in causal relations (are 
‘energetic’ in Marty’s terms).91 However, Brentano argues, in transforming 
the concept of thing into the concept of what is capable of standing in causal 
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relations, Marty has “permitted himself to deviate from long-established 
usage”: 
  
 a term which has traditionally been the most simple and the most general of all our 
terms has hereby been transformed into a sophisticated thought-combination which 
has been a matter of controversy since the time of Hume. Given Marty’s sense of 
the term ‘thing’, we would have to say that according to Hume and Mill and many 
others, there are no things at all! (1930, p. 108, Eng. p. 96) 
  
The opposition between physical and psychical things, too, is an opposition 
formulated in material-ontological terms, so that to describe Brentano as a 
‘dualist’ is to misunderstand the formal nature of his views. Certainly 
Brentano accepts spiritual substances (souls) as possible objects of 
presentation. And he accepts three-dimensional bodies also. However, the 
psychological origins of Brentano’s views imply that it is not at all clear that 
he accepted as objects of presentation physical bodies in Kotarbiński’s 
sense. Thus material things, for Brentano, are not restricted to three-
dimensional physical bodies. They embrace first of all ‘topoids’ of higher 
numbers of dimensions, which conceivably exist as it were alongside the 
more familiar three-dimensional bodies given in perception. Brentano’s 
concept of thing embraces further things of lower numbers of dimensions, 
above all boundaries (points, lines and surfaces). Note, however, that while 
Brentano does not rule out topoids of higher numbers of dimensions, he 
rejects the idea that three-dimensional bodies might turn out to be 
boundaries of four- or more-dimensional topoids. This is because a 
boundary can exist only as the boundary of the thing which it bound. Thus 
spatial and temporal points, on Brentano’s conception, never exist in 
isolation from the things, extended in time and space, of which they are the 
boundaries. A body, on the other hand, is a thing in its own right, which 
requires no other thing (except possibly God) in order to exist.92  
 Kotarbiński, in contrast, reflects not at all on the nature of boundaries. 
More generally his work, like that of Leśniewski, lacks any topological 
dimension; things are seen as being arbitrarily divisible and as arbitrarily 
conjoinable (without even the topological requirement of connectedness in 
the latter case). This is despite the strong tradition of topology in Polish 
mathematics, and despite the fact that – as is shown for example by Tarski 
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and by Grzegorczyk (1977) – topological axioms can be added very easily 
to the axioms of Leśniewski’s Mereology.  
 Brentano accepts also certain sui generis zero-dimensional things, which 
he calls souls. These have the capacity to comprehend intentionally things of 
all higher dimensions,93 a notion which recalls Aristotle’s dictum in De 
Anima (429 b 25ff., 430 a 14f.), to the effect that the soul is somehow 
everything, for its nature is to be able to know everything and therefore in a 
certain sense to include everything within itself. Like the Leibnizian monad, 
so also the Brentanian soul is unextended, and therefore not continuously 
many; yet it is for all that continuously manifold, comparable in this respect 
to the midpoint of a disc divided radially into segments of continuously 
varying colours.94  
 The two philosophers differ further in virtue of the fact that, for 
Brentano, not all things need be perceivable. Thus souls are not perceivable, 
or at least not directly: we can apprehend intuitively at most the activities of 
the soul (the soul as modally extended in certain ways).95  Further, topoids 
of greater numbers of dimensions would not be perceivable; and nor, either, 
would the empty spaces which Brentano came to accept at the very end of 
his life. 
 The most radical difference between the two philosophers turns, 
however, on the fact that Brentano takes tense seriously in the sense that for 
him ‘exists’ is in every case synonymous with ‘exists now, in the present 
moment’, so that everything exists for Brentano only according to a 
boundary (einer Grenze nach). This means that every existing object is as it 
were punctual from the point of view of its temporal extension, though 
always in such a way as to depend for its existence on that which has just 
existed or on that which will exist as supplying the continuum which it 
bounds.96  
 For Brentano, then, it is as if the world of things is continuously 
annihilated and recreated anew with each successive passing instant. ‘Past 
thing’ and ‘future thing’ do not, therefore, refer to special kinds of things, 
but are modifying expressions, to be compared with ‘hoped for thing’, 
‘imagined thing’ and so on. Our apparent references to the past and future 
are in fact in every case references to the present as set apart temporally 
either as future or as past from something else. This ‘something else’ refers, 
however, merely modo obliquo and embodies no ontological commitment 
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(in much the same way that our reference to a believer in demons or in fates 
involves no ontological commitment to demons or fates).97  
 Brentano’s world is, therefore, in this respect, too, entirely different from 
that of Kotarbiński, for it is a world in which there exists only one instant of 
time (even if this time is continuously changing). Brentano in fact identifies 
what is real with what is subject to a certain continuous temporal 
transformation which is simultaneously a matter of existing in the present, 
ceasing to be future and becoming past.98  
 Kotarbiński certainly holds that all things exist in time. Yet he reflects 
very little on the peculiar ontological features of things not yet and no longer 
existing – though we may assume e.g. from his discussion of the ‘things of 
history’ that he accepts into his ontology also past and future things.99   
 The ontological views adopted by Brentano at the very end of his life 
take him even further from reism in the Kotarbińskian sense. Things are 
now conceived by Brentano as falling into two groups, which we might 
refer to as places and souls. Places may be ‘empty’ (lacking in all qualitative 
determination), or they may be qualitatively extended or enriched (filled by 
qualities) in different ways. A three-dimensional qualitatively extended 
place is called a body.100  
 Brentano had earlier adopted a Cartesian view of space according to 
which space and quality are mutually dependent. On his later view, quality 
is one-sidedly dependent on space: space can exist without quality but 
quality cannot exist except as the quality of some particular place. A 
somewhat counterintuitive consequence of this view is that any change of 
place or shape brings about the annihilation of the ‘body’ in question, so that 
bodies cannot move. Movement is, rather, the becoming modally extended 
in appropriate ways of a continuum of different places in continuous 
temporal succession, rather like a ripple ‘moving’ across the surface of a 
pond, no molecule of which is displaced in the horizontal. There is no 
Chisholm (qua material object), but only a continuous sequence of 
Chisholmy places, so that Brentano’s later ontology implies just that view 
which is at the basis of Leśniewski’s logical grammar – that there is a sense 
in which we need not distinguish between proper names and predicates. 
 We can come to some understanding of the reasons why Brentano came 
to choose places as the ultimate non-psychic substances if we examine again 
the list of the marks of substance set out in §6 above. Places are (i) 
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individual and (ii) neither ‘present in a subject’ nor such as to ‘require a 
support from things or substances in order to exist’. (iii) They can exist on 
their own, i.e. without being filled or qualified in any way. If, further, 
substance is identified with place, then it becomes clear why substances 
underlie accidents and do not themselves need accidents in order to exist 
(where it would seem that the organic substances canvassed by Aristotle 
would depend for their existence on processes of breathing, of metabolising, 
etc.). Places, from this point of view, come to appear similar in this respect 
to the later Aristotelian concept of prima materia – both are infinitely plastic 
in the sense that they can take on qualities ad libitum. They come close also 
to the undifferentiated Lockean I-know-not-what which would serve as the 
ultimate support for the qualities given in experience.  
 Most importantly, as Brentano insists, places are (iv) the best possible 
candidate for the role of that which individuates the accidents by which they 
are filled. We can say that for the later Brentano a body is the accident 
(qualitative extension) of a place, and that a place is that which individuates 
one body from another. Two qualitatively identical things at different places 
are distinct, as Brentano sees it, only because their location is distinct.101 
Further, (v) places can admit contrary accidents, being now filled by 
something red, now by something black, and they are also (viii) 
‘independent of thinking’, and (ix) such as to endure through time. 
 Only (vi), (vii) and (x) are less easily applied to the concept of place. As 
we have seen, however, the mismatch in regard to (vi) can be explained by 
pointing to the psychological origins of Brentano’s views, and in regard to 
(x) there is in fact no essential disagreement, since while Brentano denies 
that things/places exist as a whole at all times at which they exist, his view 
that they exist merely according to a boundary, a view quite different from 
the phase ontologist’s view that they exist only in one or other temporal 
part, is in fact in keeping with the views of Aristotle. Which leaves only 
(vii), which is indeed rejected with great force by Brentano – as also by 
Kotarbiński – since neither philosopher imposes on things a requirement of 
unity. From this point of view, however, the concept place recommends 
itself still more strongly as that in terms of which an account of material 
(non-mental) substance is to be provided, since to regard things as merely 
(differently qualified) places is precisely to guarantee that arbitrary 
divisibility and conjoinability of things on which both philosophers insist. 
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So strongly, indeed, does Kotarbiński identify the divisibility of things into 
parts with their extension in space and time, that we may argue that 
Kotarbiński, too, ought properly to have accepted the idea that things are 
ultimately four-dimensional volumes of spacetime – a view that has been 
found attractive by not a few contemporary philosophers.  
 Note that in order properly to understand Brentano’s view of (non-
mental) substances as places, and in order to make sense of its superficially 
absurd implication that substances cannot move, nor change their shape, it is 
important once again to recall the psychological origins of Brentano’s 
views. For Brentano had tended from the very start to view the world of 
transcendent objects as something like a sensory surface (as, say, the surface 
of the visual field). Objects come thereby to be seen as similar in many 
respects to the images reflected on a screen. They are capable of being 
demarcated as things and as parts of things, and they are capable of being 
presented as moving, yet in both cases we have to do not with autonomous 
properties on the side of the objects themselves, but with mere ascriptions of 
properties to the images we experience. It would take us too far afield to 
give a precise account of Brentano’s views of autonomous reality. Clearly, 
however, his thinking is at least in some respects comparable to that of 
Mach and Einstein, both of whom sought to cast off ‘metaphysical’ 
assumptions such as that of independent substance.102   
 
 
§15. The Varieties of Reism 
 
For all the divergences between Kotarbiński’s pansomatist reism and the 
later formal ontology of Brentano, there is a clear sense in which they are 
proponents of a common approach to ontology. This approach is shared also 
by Leśniewski and his followers, as also by Quine, Goodman and other 
modern nominalists. It can perhaps be characterised as an approach which 
takes as its starting point in the construction of its ontology a view of things 
drawing equally on examples of quantities, masses or homogeneous 
collectives as on the unitary substances of the tradition. Thus it is contrasted 
with the approach to ontology of Aristotle,103 Leibniz, Twardowski and 
Ingarden, which takes its cue primarily from the unitary substance and from 
the individual accidents which may inhere therein. 
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 There are, interestingly, a number of different routes taken by the 
philosophers mentioned to the homogeneous collective view of things 
(‘homogeneous’ because the distinction between thing and mass is held to 
reflect no fundamental ontological division). Thus Quine, for example, 
seems to have been inspired particularly by those physical examples (energy 
fields, liquids, gases) where arbitrary delineability does indeed seem to hold, 
as also by related considerations deriving from the semantic treatment of 
mass terms in natural language. Quine, like Brentano104 and Kotarbiński, 
sees masses as full-fledged even though possibly scattered individuals. Thus 
he regards as of no importance the difference between what is spatially 
continuous and what is spatially scattered,105 and indeed his general 
appraoch is to view every object as a four-dimensional section of the world, 
after the fashion of what Zemach calls ‘events’. 
 Field-theoretic physics played a role also in inspiring the later 
Brentano’s view of things as accidents of places, as also in securing 
Brentano’s acceptance of topoids of higher numbers of dimensions.106 
Brentano’s acceptance of the homogeneous collective view was however 
motivated principally by his early work on the psychology of sensation, and 
for this reason he may have resisted the idea that ‘thing’ involves as one of 
its marks the concept of resistance or inertia. Goodman, too, was provoked 
by considerations deriving from the psychology of sensation in developing 
his ontology of ‘individuals’ in The Structure of Appearance, and Quine was 
to some extent led to the homogeneous collective view by psychological 
considerations concerning ostension.107  
 Leśniewski, on the other hand, was brought to his version of the 
homogeneous collective view of things by formal considerations deriving 
from the general theory of part and whole and from his critique of the 
set-theoretic paradoxes, though such formal considerations played a role of 
course also in the work of Goodman and Quine (as indeed in the work of 
Whitehead).  
 Both the homogeneous collective ontology and the Aristotelian 
substance ontology are contrasted, now, with ontologies allowing general, 
abstract and non-temporal entities of various kinds. Thus they may be 
contrasted with the positions of, for example Bolzano and Frege, or with 
Platonist ontologies of sets or classes. Bolzano, Frege and the set-theoretical 
Platonists are, we might say, maximally liberal in the sense that they impose 
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on the entities admitted into their ontologies none of the conditions of 
temporality, inertness, perceivability and so on that have concerned us in the 
foregoing. Marty and the early Brentano are one degree less liberal than this, 
in that, while they admit into their ontologies entia rationis of various kinds, 
they insist that all such entities enjoy a strictly temporal existence. They 
thereby recognise a division among temporal entities between the real or 
energetic on the one hand and the non-real or anergetic on the other. The 
bicategorial nominalist ontology sketched in §11 above imposes the further 
restriction that all entities be not only temporal but also energetic. The 
bicategorialist does not, however, insist that all energetic objects must also 
count as things, since he holds that events in his sense may enter into causal 
relations. The later Brentano did however impose this further restriction, 
though at the same time he abandoned the requirement that all things must 
be ‘energetic’ in the sense of being such as to enter into causal relations. 
 Kotarbiński can be said to have gone one step further than Brentano in 
insisting that all things are physical bodies. Neither Brentano nor 
Kotarbiński however lays any requirement of unity on the objects in their 
respective ontologies, as contrasted with Aristotle – qua ontologist of first 
substance – who does impose a requirement of this sort. All of which 
implies that there is a spectrum of gradually more restrictive positions, from 
the Platonism of abstract objects at the one extreme to the Aristotelianism of 
unitary substances at the other, a spectrum which may be represented as 
follows:108  
 
All entities 
are 
Platonism 
(Frege etc.) 
Marty Bicategorial 
Nominalism
Brentano Kotarbiński Aristotle 
qua 
Substance 
Ontologist 
Temporal No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Energetic No No Yes No Yes Yes 
Things No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Physical 
bodies 
No No No No Yes No 
Unitary No No No No No Yes 
 
We could go further, and extend the chart by taking into account oppositions 
of other sorts, relating for example to the issue as to whether entities are or 
are not general,109 independent of mind,110 atomic,111 or such as to have 
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temporal parts.112 In addition we could think more carefully about the 
different meanings of ‘unitary’, distinguishing for example the requirement 
of connectedness of parts, the requirement of spatial separateness from other 
entities, the requirement of functional interdependence of parts, and so on. 
We could investigate further the extent to which things may have parts 
which are themselves things – as an organism may include cells, 
chromosomes, genes, etc. as parts.113  
 Already as it stands, however, the chart will enable us to see the 
inadequacy of any simple-minded opposition between ‘reism’ on the one 
hand and ‘Platonism’ on the other. Thus it would be wrong to go along with 
Lejewski in his view that ‘Ontologists who oppose reism are believers in so 
called abstract entities’ (1979, p. 210114), a view dictated no doubt by the 
fact that the principal enemies of the homogeneous collective view in recent 
philosophy have been advocates of ontologies based on the theory of sets or 
of a more or less Platonistically oriented semantics.115 More recently, 
however, and especially with the bringing to light of hitherto neglected 
aspects of the Brentanian and Husserlian ontologies, it has become clear that 
reism has other, non-Platonistic opponents. Thus for example it would not 
be to move into the realm of abstract entities were one to embrace in one’s 
ontology events as well as things. For events may be accepted – as for 
example on Davidson’s account, and indeed on that of Whitehead – as bona 
fide individual entities existing in time and space and entering into causal 
relations with other events. More controversially, we may say that Brentano 
(and Husserl) have shown how we may cope in a non-Platonistic framework 
with those kinds of dependent, inseparable, divisive, interpenetrative parts 
which fall outside the purview of mereology as standardly conceived but 
which yet seem indispensable to an understanding of the structures of minds, 
and of the different sorts of relations between minds and other concrete 
objects. 
 
 
Notes 
 
 1 First published in: Woleński 1990, 137–148, with kind permission of Kluwer 
Academic Publishers. I am grateful to Audoenus Leblanc, Czesław Lejewski, Dieter 
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Münch, Karl Schuhmann, Peter Simons and Jan Woleński for helpful comments on an 
earlier version of this paper. 
 2 See his Logic and Philosophy in the Lvov-Warsaw School, and compare also Schnelle 
1982 and the papers by Schnelle in Cohen and Schnelle, eds. 1986. 
 3 Kotarbiński distinguished also an eighth stage, in which reism is no longer a theory 
but rather a ‘semantic problem’. 
 4 Twardowski 1894, p. 105, Eng. p. 100. 
 5 1900/01, 2nd Investigation, §11. 
 6 See Leśniewski 1913, p. 319, and also the summary of Leśniewski’s argument in 
Kotarbiński 1920, and Lejewski 1979, pp. 200f. As Woleński (1988) shows, Leśniewski 
was influenced here by Marty’s criticism of Husserl’s Platonism in his Investigations of 
General Grammar (1908), §71. 
 7 Smith 1989, 1988. 
 8 See Leśniewski 1914, 1927/31. It may be also that Leśniewski’s criticism of 
properties in his 1913 helped to provoke Kotarbiński’s initial nominalism. 
 9 Leśniewski 1927/31, p. 17, citing Cantor 1887/88, pp. 421f. 
 10 Leśniewski 1927/31, p. 18, citing Frege 1893, pp. 2f., Eng. p. 31. 
 11 Leśniewski 1927/31, p. 22. 
 12 1927/31, p. 24. 
 13 Leśniewski 1929, pp. 6, 78, Lejewski 1958, pp. 123f. 
 14 Interestingly, Tarski, at least in his early years, up to and including his paper on “The 
Semantic Conception of Truth”, agreed with Leśniewski in this (see esp. pp. 342f. of 
Tarski 1944). Tarski, be it noted, was never a formalist: Tarski and Leśniewski parted 
company rather because Tarski came gradually to accept the use of set theory and 
infinitistic methods in his work. 
 15 See Twardowski 1894, §§1–2. Leśniewski did not himself develop a theory of 
contents, since he held that the problems involved would be too difficult to allow him to 
achieve the appropriate degree of theoretical rigour. 
 16 See the detailed account in Lejewski 1979. Kotarbiński’s initial reaction to 
Ajdukiewicz’s criticism was in part inspired by Carnap. 
 17 Cf. 1966, p. 433. 
 18 Something similar would be required to exclude from the realm of things also certain 
sorts of events. Consider, for example, a rotation of a metal sphere. This rotation is 
extended in space and time and, again, it is such as to offer resistance. Note that what is 
established by the argument in the text is merely that the canonical reistic notion of thing 
is indeterminate in its application. The argument is not designed to show that one could 
not deal satisfactorily with colours (or three-dimensional shapes or masses of sound or 
heat) within the Leśniewskian framework. As Lejewski has suggested, just as 
Chronology and Stereology (theories of time and space) can in principle be obtained 
from Mereology by the addition of certain extra-logical constants, so  it would be 
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possible to conceive a discipline of Colourology, obtained by adding constant terms 
such red, blue, etc., and a relational predicate such as is the same colour as. 
 19 See my 1989 for an account of Twardowski’s theory of states of affairs. Later, 
however, Twardowski criticised theories of truth, such as that of Russell, which 
employed categories such as state of affairs or fact. 
 20 Met., 1011 b 25ff. Less neutral is Aristotle’s remark, somewhat later in the 
Metaphysics, to the effect that truth and falsehood depend ‘on the side of the objects on 
their being combined or separated, so that he who thinks the separated to be separated 
and the combined to be combined has the truth, while he whose thought is in a state 
contrary to that of the objects is in error.’ (1051 b 3, emphasis supplied.) 
 21 On this terminology of ‘making true’ see Mulligan, Simons and Smith 1984. The 
terminology has a number of advantages over the more usual talk of correspondence. It 
is disembarrassed, first of all, of all connotations of ‘copying’. It does not suggest that 
the relation between a sentence and that in virtue of which it is true would be a 
symmetrical relation. And it can cope with the fact that there may be more than one 
entity which makes or helps to make a given sentence true. Thus, in the simplest 
possible case, ‘I have a headache’, may be made true by my present headache (‘from the 
beginning to the end of its existence’), or by any phase of this headache overlapping 
with my present utterance, or by relevant states of nervous tissue upon which my 
headache supervenes. 
 22 Similarly when a person states the fact of London’s lying somewhere on the Thames, 
‘he merely states, in a devious way, that London lies on the Thames’ and here – as 
Kotarbiński conceives it – no reference is made to facts or states of affairs or anything 
other than things. (1966, p. 429) 
 23 Kotarbiński 1966, pp. 52, 401, n. 4. 
 24 1966, p. 426. Compare Szaniawski 1977. 
 25 1966, pp. 330f., 426. 
 26 Similar difficulties arise for the proposed reistic translation of ‘Justice is a virtue of 
honest people’ by ‘Any honest man is just’ (Woleński 1987, p. 168). For it may be that 
all honest men are as a matter of fact just, though not in virtue of being honest. 
 27 See §3 of Mulligan, Simons and Smith 1984, for a discussion of this example. There 
is, notoriously, a parallel selectivity of ‘cause’. Consider for example a sentence such as: 
The fact that agreement was reached caused universal joy, which Kotarbiński 
(somewhat counterintuitively) wants to render as: All were overjoyed when they agreed. 
(1935, p. 491) 
 28 See Tegtmeier 1981 for an extended discussion of such cases and of the reasons why 
they seem to dictate an ontology richer than that of the reist. 
 29 Lejewski 1979, p. 206. A compromise position is put forward by Wolniewicz in his 
paper in Woleński 1990. Wolniewicz maintains that sufficient support for reism is 
provided by a demonstration that it is possible to reduce apparently non-reistic theories 
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to theories having a reistic axiomatisation. Reism, on this basis, would thereby concern 
whole theories and not separate sentences. 
 30 See e.g. Brentano 1874, pp. 124–32, Eng. pp. 88–94; Twardowski 1894, p. 3, Eng. p. 
1; Höfler 1890, §6. 
 31 See e.g. Marty 1908, p. 401. 
 32 Cf. Kotarbiński 1966, p. 342. From this it follows, too, that there cannot be psychic 
subjects if the latter are conceived as systems or sequences of contents or images: see 
Kotarbiński 1935, p. 493. 
 33 1966, p. 344. 
 34 Cf. Kotarbiński 1966, p. 346; 1935, pp. 495f. 
 35 Kotarbiński 1966, p. 347; 1935, p. 499. 
 36 See Twardowski 1912 and the discussion in Smith 1989. 
 37 See Köhler 1947, pp. 128ff., Koffka 1935, pp. 655ff. 
 38 1966, p. 347. Similar notions are present also in the writings of Theodor Lipps on the 
notion of empathy: see e.g. his 1905. 
 39 A view employed especially by Marty as the basis of a theory of linguistic 
communication. 
 40 Davidson 1968, p. 108. 
 41 1927/31, p. 10. 
 42 Cf. Küng and Canty 1970. 
 43 Compare, for what follows, Novak 1963/64. 
 44 Cf. Brentano 1933, pp. 37, 108, 112, 131, Eng. pp. 37, 86, 88, 109. 
 45 See Met., 1042 b 15–32, for other kinds of unity. 
 46 See Ingarden 1964/65, vol. I, §§28f. 
 47 As is clear from Aristotle’s treatment of (ii), it is possible that the marks of the 
concept of substance may be established in part through considerations of the language 
we use to refer to substances themselves. See Met., 1029 b 13. 
 48 See e.g. 1966, pp. 326ff.   
 49 1966, pp. 327, 435, 342. Note that, like inertness, these marks are held by Kotarbiński 
to be incidental; that is, they do not affect the extension of the concept thing or body. 
 50 The latter consist of human beings standing in certain relations to each other – which 
is not, of course, to say that there exist entities called relations (of dependence, 
leadership, authority etc.), in addition to and as it were alongside the human beings 
themselves. The various elements of a given institution are somehow related one to 
another for example in the sense that some of them behave in such a way because the 
others behave in such a way. A similar treatment is offered by Kotarbiński for terms like 
‘function’, ‘disposition’, and so on. As Kotarbiński would have it, “’X has the function 
of typist in a bank’ means the same as: X systematically types letters according to the 
instructions of her superior” (1966, p. 490). 
 51 1894, pp. 88, 105, Eng. pp. 86, 100. Cf. Ingarden 1964/65, vol. I, p. 219. 
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 52 Irrespective, even, of whether a and b exist at the same time. See Simons 1987 for 
criticisms of this and related aspects of Leśniewski’s Mereology. 
 53 Chisholm 1978, p. 199. 
 54 More generally we arrive at a sentence containing exclusively logical constants and 
‘genuine names’. See Woleński 1987, p. 168. 
 55 We here leave out of account peculiarities arising from Leśniewski’s special reading 
of the quantifiers. 
 56 Leśniewski’s concern to allow fictitious or empty names was almost certainly 
inspired in part by Twardowski, whose treatment of non-existence also influenced 
Meinong. See Twardowski 1894, pp. 30, 33, Eng. pp. 28, 30f. 
 57 Küng 1967, p. 111. We may conjecture that such apparent logico-grammatical 
distinctions as that between common and proper names, marked in English by the 
presence or absence of articles, were overlooked by Leśniewski, again, because of the 
lack of articles in the Polish language. 
 58 Here, again, he was almost certainly influenced in part by Twardowski. See the 
latter’s defence of absolute truth in his 1902. 
 59 Bolzano, too, in §45 of the Wissenschaftslehre, sees time-determinations as part of 
the subject, so that, as he puts it, ‘a pair of propositions such as “Caius is now learned” 
and “Caius was not learned ten years ago” turn out to have different subjects.’ 
 60 See Brentano 1976, Part II, Ch. VIII. 
 61 A similar suggestion is implicit also in Leśniewski’s work. See e.g. Sinisi 1983, pp. 
57ff., quoting from the final section of Leśniewski 1927/31. Cf. also Lejewski 1982. 
 62 Sinisi 1983, p. 55. 
 63 See Woleński 1987, pp. 170f. 
 64 It should go without saying, in light of our discussion of Ontology in §7 above, that 
we do not share this estimation of the nature of Leśniewski’s achievement. 
 65 Sinisi 1983, p. 58, quoting Leśniewski 1927/31. 
 66 Chisholm 1976, pp. 98f. Woodger, who independently developed a phase ontology 
similar to that of Leśniewski, comes close to a view of this sort in his 1939. 
 67 A natural language reading of ‘Johnnow’ may involve a necessary indeterminacy in the 
precise extent of the relevant interval; since this indeterminacy can in principle be 
eliminated, however (for example by utilising the resources of a formal theory such as 
the ‘Chronology’ proposed by Lejewski in his 1982), we can ignore the matter here. 
 68 This analogy is of course very restricted (see e.g. Mellor 1981, pp. 66f., 128ff.). The 
acceptance of the concept of a world line in a four-dimensional continuum is moreover 
fully consistent with a continued belief in the ontology of things (Sellars 1962, p. 578). 
One might indeed go further and argue that the concepts of the four-dimensional 
ontology themselves presuppose the thing ontology for their coherent formulation, that, 
for example, the idea of a world line makes sense only if there is some identical thing 
that is tracked from one time-point on the line to another (see Simons 1987, pp. 126f.). 
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See also Brentano, 1976, pp. 296ff. for further criticisms of the view of time as a ‘fourth 
dimension’ of space. 
 69 See also the discussion of ‘existence in the present’ in Ingarden 1964/65, §30. 
 70 Sinisi 1966, summarising part of ch. IV of Leśniewski 1927/31. 
 71 This is to exclude, for example, the case where a bona fide bulky and resistant whole 
is united with, say, an empty volume of spacetime. 
 72 See Simons 1983 for a formal treatment of a view along these lines within a 
Leśniewskian framework.   
 73 See Mourelatos 1981; Galton 1984, Appendix II; Hoeksema 1985, ch. 6. 
 74 It is above all Ingarden who has invested effort in the ontological analysis of these 
distinctions. See his 1964/65, ch. V. 
 75 See Twardowski 1894, pp. 12f., Eng. pp. 11f., and also his 1923. Twardowski’s 
theory was derived in turn from Brentano 1924/25, vol. II, p. 62, Eng. p. 220. See also 
Husserl 1979, p. 309, Marty 1884, pp. 179f., 1895, p. 34, 1908, pp. 518f., and 
Leśniewski 1927/31, p. 48, n. 78. There may be a remnant of this doctrine of modifying 
expressions also in Kotarbiński’s notion of ‘substitutive renderings’ or ‘onomatoids’ 
discussed above. 
 76 Thus, for example, just as we can have a pseudo-Boolean algebra with 
pseudo-complements (see e.g. Rasiowa and Sikorski 1963, pp. 52f.), so also we might 
distinguish a family of pseudo-mereologies. 
 77 Met. 1206 b 16; see also 1024 b 30, 1018 a 2, 1030 b 13. See also Suarez’s discussion 
of the ‘accidens concretum’ in his Disputationes Metaphysicae, XXXIX, s.1, n. 10–12 
and cf. Cajetan, In De Ente et Essentia d. Thomas Aquinatis, §§153ff. 
 78 Cf. Kotarbiński 1966a, p. 461, Eng. p. 195; Brentano 1924/25, pp. 228–77, Eng. pp. 
330–68. 
 79 1924/25, vol. II, pp. 56ff., Eng. pp. 213ff. (Brentano later adopted an amended 
version of this view: see his 1924/25, vol. II, pp. 164–72, Eng. pp. 295–301.) The topic 
of existential judgments was taken up by a number of philosophers in the years around 
the turn of the century and seems to have played a role also in inspiring the subject of 
Leśniewski’s dissertation under Twardowski in 1911. This includes a discussion not 
only of Brentano’s Psychologie but also of Twardowski’s Content and Object and of 
Husserl’s Logical Investigations. Leśniewski may also have been influenced by the 
Sketch of a Theory of Existential Judgments of Hans Cornelius, with whom he studied in 
Munich. 
 80 Cf. Smith 1990 for a more detailed discussion of this point. 
 81 1889, §§50, 55; Marty 1884, pp. 171ff.; Twardowski 1894, p. 36, Eng. pp. 33f. 
 82 Ingarden put this view to Kotarbiński around 1935 when the latter came to Lemberg 
to give a talk on Leibniz as a precursor of reism. (Personal communication of W. 
Bednarowski.) 
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 83 He was followed in this by his later disciples, above all Oskar Kraus, Alfred Kastil 
and Georg Katkov, who took over from Kotarbiński the word ‘reism’ to describe the 
later Brentanian view. See Kraus 1937, pp. 268ff. 
 84 Brentano 1924/25, vol. II, p. 162, Eng. p. 294. 
 85 Cf. Brentano 1930, pp. 87–97, Eng. pp. 77–87; 1956, pp. 38–48; Srzednicki 1965, p. 
48; Chisholm 1978. 
 86 See Met. Z, and the discussion in Smith 1987. 
 87 1924/25, vol. II, pp. 162, 213f., Eng. pp. 294, 321f.; 1933, p. 18, Eng. p. 24; 1956, 
p. 38. 
 88 These negative arguments are supplemented by an appeal to the fact that the language 
of things is psychologically more natural. Thus one natural way of explaining the 
meanings of words is to eliminate substitutive terms: ‘Should we wish to explain to a 
child what the word "similarity" means, should we not show him in turn several pairs of 
objects which look alike?’ (1966, p. 423) 
 89 On the opposition between formal and material concepts see Smith 1981; on 
Brentano and formal concepts see Münch 1986; on formal vs. material ontology see 
Ingarden 1964/65, esp. §9. 
 90 Albert the Great defends a similar view of being as the simplest concept from which 
no further abstraction can be made, and according to Brentano (1930, p. 108, Eng. p. 97) 
a parallel notion is present also in Aquinas. 
 91 1908, §66. 
 92 See Brentano 1933, p. 108, Eng. p. 96; 1976, pp. 38, 95. 
 93 See Brentano 1933, pp. 158f., Eng. pp. 119f.; 1976, pp. 20, 120f. 
 94 See Brentano 1976, pp. 41ff. 
 95 Aristotle, too, seems to exclude immaterial substances from the realm of sensible 
substances. Cf. Met., 988 b 26, 1040 b 31ff. 
 96 See Brentano 1976, e.g. p. 37. 
 97 Brentano 1976, Part II, Section III. 
 98 Brentano 1976, Part Two, Section V. 
 99 See 1966, pp. 369f. Cf. also op. cit., p. 191, where Kotarbiński denies the suggestion 
that ‘is’ would be an abbreviation of ‘is now’. 
 100 Brentano 1933, pp. 35f., Eng. p. 36. 
 101 Note that times could not be candidates for the role of that which individuates one 
body from another (as was held for example by Lotze); for as we have seen, everything 
that exists is for Brentano such as to exist in the same time. 
 102 Some clues as to Brentano’s views are provided by the argument for the a priori 
impenetrability of bodies in his 1976, pp. 180ff. Brentano’s views in this respect seem to 
have been stimulated by the positivism of Auguste Comte: see Münch 1989. 
 103 Here and in what follows we consider Aristotle exclusively as an ontologist of first 
substance. 
 104 See Brentano’s treatment of continua in Part I of his 1976. 
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 105 Quine 1960, pp. 90–110. 
 106 See the “Appendix” to Brentano 1933: “The Nature of the Corporeal World in the 
Light of the Theory of Categories”, and also Brentano 1976, p. 184. 
 107 Cf. e.g. Quine 1960, p. 52. 
 108 Again, the reader should bear in mind that it is by no means clear where Aristotle 
would have to be posted on this spectrum if the whole of his ontology were taken into 
account. 
 109 There is a sense in which Twardowski admitted general things. See 1894, §15, and 
also Ingarden 1964/65, vol. I, p. 219. 
 110 Ingarden admitted both autonomous and dependent things, examples of the latter 
being creatures of fiction. See 1964/65, §12 and ch. IX. 
 111 Is the ultimate furniture of the universe itself atomic? Do all entities have atomic 
parts? See Sobociński 1971, and also Bunt 1985, for an interesting treatment of these 
issues from the point of view of the semantics of mass and count expressions. 
 112 See, again, Zemach 1970. 
 113 See Woodger 1937, for an experiment in this direction. 
 114 Compare Lejewski’s assertion in his 1976 to the effect that events are non-material 
objects, so that anyone who admits events into his ontology would be a ‘Platonist’ on 
Lejewski’s reading of this term. This reading is no doubt derived from the fact that 
events, for Lejewski, are the referents of abstract nouns like swimming, falling, talking. 
 115 More generally, they have been advocates of what Woleński calls ‘standard 
predicate logic semantics’ in his 1987, p. 170. 
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